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ABSTRACT
Peng Li: Replication and placement for security in distributed systems
(Under the direction of Michael K. Reiter)
In this thesis we show how the security of replicated objects in distributed systems, in terms of
either the objects’ confidentiality or availability, can be improved through the placement of objects’
replicas so as to carefully manage the nodes on which objects’ replicas overlap.
In the first part of this thesis we present StopWatch , a system that defends against timing-
based side-channel attacks that arise from coresidency of victims and attackers in infrastructure-
as-a-service clouds and threaten confidentiality of victims’ data. StopWatch triplicates each cloud-
resident guest virtual machine (VM) and places replicas so that the three replicas of a guest VM
are coresident with nonoverlapping sets of (replicas of) other VMs. StopWatch uses the timing of
I/O events at a VM’s replicas collectively to determine the timings observed by each one or by an
external observer, so that observable timing behaviors are similarly likely in the absence of any other
individual, coresident VM. We detail the design and implementation of StopWatch in Xen, evaluate
the factors that influence its performance, demonstrate its advantages relative to alternative defenses
against timing side-channels with commodity hardware, and address the problem of placing VM
replicas in a cloud under the constraints of StopWatch so as to still enable adequate cloud utilization.
We then explore the problem of placing object replicas on nodes in a distributed system to maxi-
mize the number of objects that remain available when node failures occur. In our model, failing (the
nodes hosting) a given threshold of replicas is sufficient to disable each object, and the adversary
selects which nodes to fail to minimize the number of objects that remain available. We specifi-
cally explore placement strategies based on combinatorial structures called t-packings; provide a
lower bound for the object availability they offer; show that these placements offer availability that
is c-competitive with optimal; and propose an efficient algorithm for computing combinations of
t-packings that maximize their availability lower bound. We compare the availability offered by our
approach to that of random replica placement, owing to the popularity of the latter approach in previ-
iii
ous work. After quantifying the availability offered by random replica placement in our model, we
show that our combinatorial strategy yields placements with better availability than random replica
placement for many realistic parameter values. Finally, we provide parameter selection strategies to
concretely instantiate our schemes for different system sizes.
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PREFACE
Object replication, and careful placement of those replicas so as to manage the overlap between
any two objects’ replicas, can be used to support security goals in distributed systems. This the-
sis demonstrates two specific uses of replication and placement for this purpose, namely to limit
side-channel information leakage between virtual machines in compute clouds and to improve the
availability of objects despite targeted failures of computers that host their replicas.
vii
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the topic of computer security has been characterized as protecting three attributes
of data (and/or computation) (e.g., [40, Chapter 1]): confidentiality or, in other words, that the
data is disclosed only to whom the data owner intends; integrity, or that the data is modified only
in intended ways and by intended parties; and availability, so that the data is accessible when
required and with the performance expected. Security is a field that adapts to include new computer
and data misuses as they become known, and some of these misuses (e.g., combating spam email)
stretch the above characterization of computer security. Still, this characterization is adequate for
the discussions of primary interest in this thesis.
It has long been argued that the goals of confidentiality, integrity and availability are themselves
in conflict, in the sense that availability focuses on ensuring data’s accessibility, whereas confiden-
tiality and integrity seek to limit its accessibility (to unintended disclosure and update, respectively).
This tension has specifically been highlighted in the use of data replication, since replicating data
to potentially far-flung locations might greatly enhance availability but put the data at risk of unin-
tended disclosure or modification (e.g., [83]). Conversely, keeping the data in a high-security vault
might enhance its confidentiality and integrity, but it might not be easily accessible when needed or
might be destroyed in a fire inside the vault, hurting its availibility.
There is a long history of research focused on striking a balance between availability by replica-
tion on the one hand, and confidentiality and integrity of the replicated data/computation on the other.
Examples include the division of certificate authorities into online (highly available) and offline (and
hence more secure) components (e.g., [56]), data storage that combines redundancy for data avail-
ability with cryptographic techniques to enhance integrity and/or confidentiality (e.g., [46]), and
the entire field of Byzantine fault-tolerant computation (see, e.g., [55, 73, 24, 18, 45] and citations
therein) to balance integrity and availability.
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Despite this attention, we show in this thesis that there is another facet of replication that,
to our knowledge, has not yet been exploited in the context of security but that provides a new
opportunity to explore the design space of secure systems—namely, the manner in which replicas
are placed on nodes. More specifically, in this thesis we explore two applications of the general idea
of constraining how the replicas of different data/computation objects overlap on nodes to improve
security for the objects. Specifically, this thesis leverages replica placement in two ways:
• In Chapter 2, we consider the problem of protecting virtual machines (VMs) submitted to
public compute clouds from the inference of their secrets by other VMs utilizing timing-
based side-channel attacks (e.g., [97]). We develop a strategy for the cloud to execute VMs
that involves replicating each VM and placing its replicas so that they overlap (reside on
the same host as) a limited number of replicas of any other VM. Then, by ensuring that the
timing of each event observable by any VM is an aggregation of the timings of this event
observable by (the machines hosting) its replicas, the limited-overlap policy ensures that any
(victim) VM can influence the timing of events observable by another (attacker) VM only
minimally. We show that timing-based side-channels available to an attacker VM are thereby
substantially mitigated. To our knowledge, this work is noteworthy in demonstrating how
replication can improve confidentiality of data by illustrating a scenario in which replication
supports confidentiality.
• In the context of using replication for availability, the previous work that considered replica
placement did so only in scenarios where computers fail probabilistically. Protecting the se-
curity of a system entails considering intelligent attackers, however, in particular ones whose
behaviors may not be characterized by a known distribution or who can target a system adap-
tively. Therefore, in Chapter 3 we study the problem of maximizing the availability of repli-
cated objects against an attacker who can disable computers in a targeted fashion, with knowl-
edge of where object replicas are placed and limited only by a budget on the total number
of computers it can disable. We show how carefully managing overlaps in the placement
of object replicas can substantially enhance object availability against this type of targeted
attacker.
2
The above contributions do not eliminate the aforementioned tensions between replication on
the one hand and confidentiality and integrity on the other. However, they do provide new insights
into unchartered parts of the tradeoff space. Specifically, they provide new ways of using replication
and specifically replica placement to enhance a singular security goal—improved confidentiality via
timing side-channel defense in the first case above, and improved availability against targeted attacks
in the second—that might be possible to leverage in conjunction with other technologies previously
described (though we leave this exploration to future work). Together, we believe that these works
add a new dimension to previous thinking about security mechanisms for replicated systems, namely
that replica placement is a critical factor influencing the utility of replication for both conventional
purposes (availability) and unconventional ones (confidentiality) in systems subject to attack.
3
CHAPTER 2 MITIGATING ACCESS-DRIVEN TIMING CHANNELS IN CLOUDS
USING STOPWATCH
Implicit timing-based information flows threaten the use of clouds for very sensitive compu-
tations. In an “infrastructure as a service” (IaaS) cloud, such an attack could be mounted by an
attacker submitting a virtual machine (VM) to the cloud that times the duration between events that
it can observe, to make inferences about a victim VM with which it is running simultaneously on
the same host but otherwise cannot access. Such “access-driven” attacks [97] were first studied
in the context of timing-based covert channels, in which the victim VM is infected with a Trojan
horse that intentionally signals information to the attacker VM by manipulating the timings that the
attacker VM observes. Of more significance in modern cloud environments, however, are timing-
based side channels, which leverage the same principles to attack an uninfected but oblivious victim
VM (e.g., [74, 97]).
In this chapter we propose an approach to defend against these timing attacks and a system,
called StopWatch , that implements this method for IaaS clouds. A timing side-channel can arise
whenever an attacker VM uses an event sequence it observes to “time” another, independent event
sequence that might reflect the victim VM’s behavior [88]. StopWatch is thus designed to system-
atically remove independence of observable event sequences where possible, first by making all
real-time clocks accessible from a guest VM to be determined instead by the VM’s own execution.
To address event sequences on which it cannot intervene this way, namely for input/output
(I/O) events, StopWatch alters I/O timings observed by the attacker VM to mimic those of a replica
attacker VM that is not coresident with the victim. Since StopWatch cannot identify attackers and
victims a priori, realizing this intuition in practice requires replicating each VM on multiple hosts
and enforcing that the replicas are coresident with nonoverlapping sets of (replicas of) other VMs
— so that, in particular, at most one attacker VM replica is coresident with a replica of the victim
VM. StopWatch then delivers any I/O event to each attacker VM replica at a time determined by
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“microaggregating” the delivery times planned by the VMMs hosting those replicas. Specifically,
StopWatch uses three replicas per VM that coreside with nonoverlapping sets of (replicas of) other
VMs and microaggregates the timing of I/O events by taking their median across all three replicas.
(Two replicas per VM seems not to be enough: one might be coresident with its victim, and by
symmetry, its I/O timings would necessarily influence the timings imposed on the pair.) Even if the
median timing of an I/O event is that which occurred at an attacker replica that is coresident with
a victim replica, timings both below and above the median occurred at attacker replicas that do not
coreside with the victim.
We detail the implementation of StopWatch in Xen, specifically to intervene on all real-time
clocks and, notably, to enforce this median behavior on “clocks” available via the I/O subsystem
(e.g., network interrupts). Moreover, for a uniprocessor VM (i.e., one limited to using only a single
virtual CPU, even when running on a physical platform with multiple physical CPUs), StopWatch
enforces deterministic execution across all of the VM’s replicas, making it impossible for an attacker
VM to utilize other internally observable clocks and ensuring the same outputs from the VM replicas.
By applying the median principle to the timing of these outputs, StopWatch further interferes with
inferences that an observer external to the cloud could make on the basis of output timings.
We evaluate the performance of our StopWatch prototype for supporting web service (file
downloads) and various types of computations. Our analysis shows that the latency overhead of
StopWatch is less than 2.8× even for network-intensive applications. We also identify adaptations
to a service that can vastly increase its performance when run over StopWatch , e.g., making file
download over StopWatch competitive with file download over unmodified Xen. For computa-
tional benchmarks, the latency induced by StopWatch is less than 2.3× and is directly correlated
with their amounts of disk I/O. Overall, the latency overhead of StopWatch is qualitatively simi-
lar to other modern systems that use VM replication for other reasons (e.g., [25]). Moreover, we
demonstrate that StopWatch can substantially outperform competing defenses against timing side-
channel attacks, namely adding uniformly random noise to event timings or running VMs on shared
hardware in a time-slicing fashion.
We also study the impact of StopWatch on cloud utilization, i.e., how many guest VMs can be
simultaneously executed on an infrastructure of n machines, each with a capacity of c guest VMs,
under the constraint that the three replicas for each guest VM coreside with nonoverlapping sets
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of (replicas of) other VMs. We show that for any c ≤ n−12 , Θ(cn) guest VMs (three replicas of
each) can be simultaneously executed; we also identify practical algorithms for placing replicas
to achieve this bound. We extend this result to Θ( cndmax ) guest VMs when guest VMs can place
different demands, up to dmax , on machine resources of capacity c. These results distinguish Stop-
Watch from the alternative of simply running each guest VM on a separate computer, which permits
simultaneous execution of only n guest VMs.
To summarize, our contributions are as follows: First, we introduce a novel approach for defend-
ing against access-driven timing side-channel attacks in “infrastructure-as-a-service” (IaaS) com-
pute clouds that leverages replication of guest VMs with the constraint that the replicas of each
guest VM coreside with nonoverlapping sets of (replicas of) other VMs. The median timings of
I/O events across the three guest VM replicas are then imposed on these replicas to interfere with
their use of event timings to extract information from a victim VM with which one is coresident.
Second, we detail the implementation of this strategy in Xen, yielding a system called StopWatch ,
and evaluate the performance of StopWatch on a variety of workloads. This evaluation sheds light
on the features of workloads that most impact the performance of applications running on Stop-
Watch and how they can be adapted for best performance. We further extend this evaluation with
a comparison to other plausible alternatives for defending holistically against access-driven timing
side-channel attacks, such as adding random noise to the observable timing of events or running
VMs on shared hardware in a time-sliced fashion. Third, we show how to place replicas under the
constraints of StopWatch to utilize a cloud infrastructure more effectively than running each guest
VM in isolation.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. We describe related work in Section 2.1. We
provide an overview of the design of StopWatch in Section 2.2 and detail how we address classes
of internal “clocks” used in timing attacks in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, we then
discuss how StopWatch extends to address richer attacks involving collaborators external to the
cloud or collaborative attacker VMs. We evaluate performance of our StopWatch prototype in
Section 2.6. We extend this evaluation to provide a comparison to other holistic timing side-channel
defenses in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 treats the replica placement problem that would be faced by
cloud operators using StopWatch , and we conclude in Section 2.9.
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2.1 Related Work
2.1.1 Timing Channel Defenses
Defenses against information leakage via timing channels are diverse, taking numerous differ-
ent angles on the problem. Research on type systems and security-typed languages to eliminate
timing attacks offers powerful solutions (e.g., [3, 94, 96]), but this work is not immediately appli-
cable to our goal here, namely adapting an existing virtual machine monitor (VMM) to support
practical mitigation of timing channels today. Other research has focused on the elimination of tim-
ing side channels within cryptographic computations (e.g., [82]) or as enabled by specific hardware
components (e.g., [72, 54]), but we seek an approach that is comprehensive.
Askarov et al. [4] distinguish between internal timing channels that involve the implicit or
explicit measurement of time from within the system, and external timing channels that involve
measuring the system from the point of view of an external observer. Defenses for both internal
(e.g., [49, 3, 94, 85]) and external (e.g., [51, 39, 4, 42, 95]) timing channels have received signif-
icant attention individually, though to our knowledge, StopWatch is novel in addressing access-
driven timing channels through a combination of both techniques. StopWatch incorporates internal
defenses to interfere with an attacker’s use of real-time clocks or “clocks” that it might derive from
the I/O subsystem. In doing so, StopWatch imposes determinism on uniprocessor VMs and then
uses this feature to additionally build an effective external defense against such attacker VMs.
StopWatch ’s internal and external defense strategies also differ individually from prior work,
in interfering with timing channels by allowing replicas (in the internal defenses) and external ob-
servers (in the external defenses) to observe only median I/O timings across the three replicas. The
median offers several benefits over the alternative of obfuscating event timings by adding random
noise (without replicating VMs): to implement random noise, a distribution from which to draw the
noise must be chosen without reference to an execution in the absence of the victim—i.e., how the
execution “should have” looked—and so ensuring that the chosen noise distribution is sufficient to
suppress all timing channels can be quite difficult. StopWatch uses replication and careful replica
placement (in terms of the other VMs with which each replica coresides) exactly to provide such a
reference. Moreover, we show that the median permits the delays incurred by the system to scale
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better than uniformly random noise allows for the same protection, as the distinctiveness of victim
behavior increases.
2.1.2 Replication
To our knowledge, StopWatch is novel in utilizing replication for timing channel defense. That
said, replication has a long history that includes techniques similar to those we use here. For exam-
ple, state-machine replication to mask Byzantine faults [78] ensures that correct replicas return the
same response to each request so that this response can be identified by “vote” (a technique related
to one employed in StopWatch ; see Section 2.2 and Section 2.5.1). To ensure that correct replicas
return the same responses, these systems enforce the delivery of requests to replicas in the same
order; moreover, they typically assume that replicas are deterministic and process requests in the
order they are received. Enforcing replica determinism has also been a focus of research in (both
Byzantine and benignly) fault-tolerant systems; most (e.g., [13, 64, 6]), but not all (e.g., [15]), do
so at other layers of the software stack than StopWatch does.
More fundamentally, to our knowledge all prior systems that enforce timing determinism across
replicas permit one replica to dictate timing-related events for the others, which does not suffice
for our goals: that replica could be the one coresident with the victim, and so permitting it to
dictate timing related events would simply “copy” the information it gleans from the victim to the
other replicas, enabling that information to then be leaked out of the cloud. Rather, by forcing the
timing of events to conform to the median timing across three VM replicas, at most one of which
is coresident with the victim, the enforced timing of each event is either the timing of a replica not
coresident with the victim or else between the timing of two replicas that are not coresident with the
victim. This strategy is akin to ones used for Byzantine fault-tolerant clock synchronization (e.g.,
see [77, Section 5.2 ]) or sensor replication (e.g., see [78, Section 5.1 ]), though we use it here for
information hiding (versus integrity).
Aside from replication for fault tolerance, replication has been explored to detect server pen-
etration [34, 23, 66, 35]. These approaches purposely employ diverse replica codebases or data
representations so as to reduce the likelihood of a single exploit succeeding on multiple replicas. Di-
vergence of replica behavior in these approaches is then indicative of an exploit succeeding on one
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but not others. In contrast to these approaches, StopWatch leverages (necessarily) identical guest
VM replicas to address a different class of attacks (timing side channels) than replica compromise.
Research on VM execution replay (e.g., [89, 32]) focuses on recording nondeterministic events
that alter VM execution and then coercing these events to occur the same way when the VM is
replayed. The replayed VM is a replica of the original, albeit a temporally delayed one, and so this
can also be viewed as a form of replication. StopWatch similarly coerces VM replicas to observe the
same event timings, but again, unlike these timings being determined by one replica (the original),
they are determined collectively using median calculations, so as to interfere with one attacker
VM replica that is coresident with the victim from simply propagating its timings to all replicas.
That said, the state-of-the-art in VM replay (e.g., [32]) addresses multiprocessor VM execution,
which our present implementation of StopWatch does not. StopWatch could be extended to support
multiprocessor execution with techniques for deterministic multiprocessor scheduling (e.g., [27]).
Mechanisms for enforcing deterministic execution through O/S-level modifications (e.g., [5]) are
less relevant to our goals, as they are not easily used by an IaaS cloud provider that accepts arbitrary
VMs to execute.
2.2 Design
Our design is focused on “infrastructure as a service” (IaaS) clouds that accept virtual ma-
chine images, or “guest VMs,” from customers to execute. Amazon EC2 (http://aws.amazon.
com/ec2/) and Rackspace (http://www.rackspace.com/) are example providers of pub-
lic IaaS clouds. Given the concerns associated with side-channel attacks in cloud environments
(e.g., [74, 97]), we seek to develop virtualization software that would enable a provider to construct
a cloud that offers substantially stronger assurances against leakage via timing channels. This cloud
might be a higher assurance offering that a provider runs alongside its normal cloud (while presum-
ably charging more for the greater assurance it offers) or a private cloud with substantial assurance
needs (e.g., run by and for an intelligence or military community).
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2.2.1 Threat Model
Our threat model is a customer who submits attacker VMs for execution that are designed to
employ timing side channels. We presume that the attacker VM is designed to extract information
from a particular victim VM, versus trying to learn general statistics about the cloud such as its
average utilization. We assume that access controls prevent the attacker VMs from accessing victim
VMs directly or from escalating their own privileges in a way that would permit them to access
victim VMs. The cloud’s virtualization software (in our case, Xen and our extensions thereof) is
trusted.
According to Wray [88], to exploit a timing channel, the attacker VM measures the timing of
observable events using a clock that is independent of the timings being measured. While the most
common such clock is real time, a clock can be any sequence of observable events. With this general
definition of a “clock,” a timing attack simply involves measuring one clock using another. Wray
identified four possible clock sources in conventional computers [88]:
• TL: the “CPU instruction-cycle clock” (e.g., a clock constructed by executing a simple timing
loop);
• Mem: the memory subsystem (e.g., data/instruction fetches);
• IO: the I/O subsystem (e.g., network, disk, and DMA interrupts); and
• RT: real-time clocks provided by the hardware platform (e.g., time-of-day registers).
2.2.2 Defense Strategy
StopWatch is designed to interfere with the use of IO and RT clocks and, for uniprocessor VMs,
TL or Mem clocks, for timing attacks. (As discussed in Section 2.1, extension to multiprocessor
VMs is a topic of future work.) IO and RT (especially RT) clocks are an ingredient in every timing
side-channel attack in the research literature that we have found, undoubtedly because real time is
the most intuitive, independent and reliable reference clock for measuring another clock. So, inter-
vening on these clocks is of paramount importance. Moreover, the way StopWatch does so forces
the scheduler in a uniprocessor guest VM to behave deterministically, interfering with attempts to
use TL or Mem clocks.
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More specifically, to interfere with IO clocks, StopWatch replicates each attacker VM (i.e.,
every VM, since we do not presume to know which ones are attacker VMs) threefold so that the
three replicas of a guest VM are coresident with nonoverlapping sets of (replicas of) other VMs.
Then, when determining the timing with which an IO event is made available to each replica, the
median timing value of the three is adopted. StopWatch addresses RT clocks by replacing a VM’s
view of real time with a virtual time that depends on the VM’s own progress, an idea due to Popek
and Kline [70].
A side effect of how StopWatch addresses IO and RT clocks is that it enforces deterministic
execution of uniprocessor attacker VM replicas, also disabling its ability to use TL or Mem clocks.
These mechanisms thus deal effectively with internal observations of time, but it remains possible
that an external observer could glean information from the real-time duration between the arrival of
packets that the attacker VM sends. To interfere with this timing channel, we emit packets to an
external observer with timing dictated by, again, the median timing of the three VM replicas.
2.2.3 Justification for the Median
Permitting only the median timing of an IO event to be observed limits the information that an
attacker VM can glean from being colocated with a victim VM of interest, because the distribution
of the median timings substantially dampens the visibility of a victim’s activities.
To see why, consider a victim VM that induces observable timings that are exponentially dis-
tributed with rate λ′, versus a baseline (i.e., non-victim) exponential distribution with rate λ > λ′.1
Figure 2.1a plots example distributions of the attacker VMs’ observations under StopWatch when
an attacker VM is coresident with the victim (“Median of two baselines, one victim”) and when
attacker VM is not (“Median of three baselines”). This figure shows that these median distributions
are quite similar, even when λ is substantially larger than λ′; e.g., λ = 1 and λ′ = 1/2 in the
example in Figure 2.1a. In this case, to even reject the null hypothesis that the attacker VM is not
coresident with the victim using a χ-square test, the attacker can do so with high confidence in the
absence of StopWatch with only a single observation, but doing so under StopWatch requires almost
1It is not uncommon to model packet inter-arrival time, for example, using an exponential distribution (e.g., [52]).
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Figure 2.1: Justification for median; baseline distribution Exp(λ), λ = 1, and victim distribution
Exp(λ′)
two orders of magnitude more (Figure 2.1b). This improvement becomes even more pronounced if
λ and λ′ are closer; the case λ = 1, λ′ = 10/11 is shown in Figure 2.1c.
In terms of the number of observations needed to extract meaningful information from the
victim VM, this assessment is very conservative, since the attacker would face numerous pragmatic
difficulties that we have not modeled here [97]. But even this simple example shows the power
of disclosing only median timings of three VM replicas, and in Section 2.4.2 we will repeat this
illustration using actual message traces.
The above illustration of the benefits of allowing only the median timing of an IO event to
be observed by an attacker is not specific to timing behaviors that are exponentially distributed.
Instead, it generalizes to any distribution. To make this clear, let Xr:m denote the random variable
that takes on the value of the r-th smallest of the m values obtained by sampling random variables
X1 . . . Xm. Let Fi(x) denote the CDF of Xi (i.e., Fi(x) = P (Xi ≤ x)) and let Fr:m(x) denote the
CDF of Xr:m. The security of StopWatch hinges on the distribution of the median X2:3 of three
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independent random variables X1, X2, X3 defined as the difference in virtual times (or, in the case
of an external observer, real times) between two subsequent IO events.
Specifically, due to the construction of StopWatch , the adversary is relegated to learning in-
formation from the difference between (i) the CDF F2:3(x) for random variables X1, X2, X3 cor-
responding to attacker VM replicas that are not coresident with a victim VM of interest, and (ii)
the CDF F ′2:3(x) for random variables X ′1, X2, X3 where X ′1 corresponds to an attacker VM that
is coresident with the victim VM of interest. An example measure of the distance between two
CDFs F(x) and Fˆ(x) is their Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance [28, p. 179], defined as D(F, Fˆ) =
maxx
∣∣∣F(x)− Fˆ(x)∣∣∣.
The following theorem shows that adopting the median microaggregation function can only
interfere with the adversary’s goal:
Theorem 1. If the distributions of X2 and X3 are overlapping (i.e., for no x is F2(x) = 0 and
F3(x) = 1, or F2(x) = 1 and F3(x) = 0), then D(F2:3, F ′2:3) < D(F1, F ′1).
Proof. Due to well-known results in order statistics (e.g., see Gu¨ngo¨r et al. [41, Result 2.4]):2
Fr:m(x) =
m∑
`=r
(−1)`−r
(
`− 1
r − 1
) ∑
I⊆{1...m}:
|I|=`
∏
i∈I
Fi(x)
In particular,
F2:3(x) =F1(x)F2(x) + F1(x)F3(x) + F2(x)F3(x)− 2F1(x)F2(x)F3(x)
F ′2:3(x) =F
′
1(x)F2(x) + F
′
1(x)F3(x) + F2(x)F3(x)− 2F
′
1(x)F2(x)F3(x)
where F ′1(x) represents the CDF of X ′1. So,
D(F2:3, F
′
2:3) =maxx
∣∣[F2(x) + F3(x)− 2F2(x)F3(x)][F1(x)− F ′1(x)]∣∣
Noting thatD(F1, F ′1) = maxx |F1(x)− F ′1(x)|, it suffices to show that |F2(x) + F3(x)− 2F2(x)F3(x)| <
1 for all x. However, since F2(x) ∈ [0, 1] and F3(x) ∈ [0, 1] for all x, |F2(x) + F3(x)− 2F2(x)F3(x)| ≤
2This equation assumes each Fi(x) is continuous. See Gu¨ngo¨r et al. [41] for the case when some Fi(x) is not
continuous.
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1 and, moreover, equals 1 only if for some x, one of F2(x) and F3(x) is 1 and the other is 0. This
last case is precluded by the theorem.
In the limit, when the distributions of X2 and X3 overlap exactly, we get a much stronger result:
Theorem 2. If X2 and X3 are identically distributed, then D(F2:3, F ′2:3) ≤ 12D(F1, F
′
1).
Proof. In this case, F2 = F3 and so
|F2(x) + F3(x)− 2F2(x)F3(x)|
reaches its maximum value of 12 at the value x yielding F2(x) = F3(x) =
1
2 .
2.3 RT clocks
Real-time clocks provide reliable and intuitive reference clocks for measuring the timings of
other events. In this section, we describe the high-level strategy taken in StopWatch to interfere with
their use for timing channels and detail the implementation of this strategy in Xen with hardware-
assisted virtualization (HVM).
2.3.1 Strategy
The strategy adopted in StopWatch to interfere with a VM’s use of real-time clocks is to virtu-
alize these real-time clocks so that their values observed by a VM are a deterministic function of the
VM’s instructions executed so far [70]. That is, after the VM executes instr instructions, the virtual
time observed from within the VM is
virt (instr)← slope × instr + start (2.1)
To determine start at the beginning of VM replica execution, the VMMs hosting the VM’s replicas
exchange their current real times; start is initially set to the median of these values. slope is initially
set to a constant determined by the tick rate of the machines on which the replicas reside.
Optionally, the VMMs can adjust start and slope periodically, e.g., after the replicas execute
an “epoch” of I instructions, to coarsely synchronize virt and real time. For example, after the k-th
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epoch, each VMM can send to the others the duration Dk over which its replica executed those I
instructions and its real time Rk at the end of that duration. Then, the VMMs can select the median
real time R∗k and the duration D∗k from that same machine and reset
startk+1 ← virtk(I)
slopek+1 ← arg min
v∈[`,u]
∣∣∣∣R∗k − virtk(I) +D∗kI − v
∣∣∣∣
for a preconfigured constant range [`, u], to yield the formula for virtk+1.3 The use of ` and u
ensures that slopek+1 is not too extreme and, if ` > 0, that slopek+1 is positive. In this way, virtk+1
should approach real time on the computer contributing the median real time R∗k over the next I
instructions, assuming that the machine and VM workloads stay roughly the same. Of course, the
smaller I-values are, the more virt follows real time and so poses the risk of becoming useful in
timing attacks. So, virt should be adjusted only for tasks for which coarse synchronization with
real time is important and then only with large I values.
2.3.2 Implementation in Xen
Real-time clocks on a typical x86 platform include timer interrupts and various hardware coun-
ters. Closely related to these real-time clocks is the time stamp counter register, which is accessed
using the rdtsc instruction and stores a count of processor ticks since reset.
2.3.2.1 Timer interrupts
Operating systems typically measure the passage of time by counting timer interrupts; i.e., the
operating system sets up a hardware device to interrupt periodically at a known rate, such as 100
times per second [87]. There are various such hardware devices that can be used for this purpose.
Our current implementation of StopWatch assumes the guest VM uses a Programmable Interval
Timer (PIT) as its timer interrupt source, but our implementation for other sources would be similar.
The StopWatch VMM generates timer interrupts for a guest on a schedule dictated by that guest’s
3In other words, if (R∗k − virtk(I) + D∗k)/I ∈ [`, u] then this value becomes slopek+1. Otherwise, either ` or u
does, whichever is closer to (R∗k − virtk(I) +D∗k)/I .
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virtual time virt as computed in Equation 2.1. To do so, it is necessary for the VMM to be able to
track the instruction count instr executed by the guest VM.
In our present implementation, StopWatch uses the guest branch count for instr , i.e., keeping
track only of the number of branches that the guest VM executes. Several architectures support
hardware branch counters, but these are not sensitive to the multiplexing of multiple guests onto a
single hardware processor and so continue to count branches regardless of the guest that is currently
executing. So, to track the branch count for a guest, StopWatch implements a virtualized branch
counter for each guest.
A question is when to inject each timer interrupt. Intel VT augments IA-32 with two new
forms of CPU operations: virtual machine extensions (VMX) root operation and VMX non-root
operation [84]. While the VMM uses root operation, guest VMs use VMX non-root operation. In
non-root operation, certain instructions and events cause a VM exit to the VMM, so that the VMM
can emulate those instructions or deal with those events. Once completed, control is transferred
back to the guest VM via a VM entry. The guest then continues running as if it had never been
interrupted.
VM exits give the VMM the opportunity to inject timer interrupts into the guest VM as the
guest’s virtual time advances. However, so that guest VM replicas observe the same timer interrupts
at the same points in their executions, StopWatch injects timer interrupts only after VM exits that
are caused by guest execution. Other VM exits can be induced by events external to the VM, such as
hardware interrupts on the physical machine; these would generally occur at different points during
the execution of the guest VM replicas but will not be visible to the guest [50, Section 29.3.2 ]. For
VM exits caused by guest VM execution, the VMM injects any needed timer interrupts on the next
VM entry.
2.3.2.2 rdtsc calls and CMOS RTC values
Another way for a guest VM to measure time is via rdtsc calls. Xen already emulates the
return values to these calls. More specifically, to produce the return value for a rdtsc call, the
Xen hypervisor computes the time passed since guest reset using its real-time clock, and then this
time value is scaled by a constant factor. StopWatch replaces this use of a real-time clock with the
guest’s virtual clock (Equation 2.1).
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A virtualized real-time clock (RTC) is also provided to HVM guests in Xen; this provides time
to the nearest second for the guest to read. The virtual RTC gets updated by Xen using its real-time
clock. StopWatch responds to requests to read the RTC using the guest’s virtual time.
2.3.2.3 Reading counters
The guest can also observe real time from various hardware counters, e.g., the PIT counter,
which repeatedly counts down to zero (at a pace dictated by real time) starting from a constant.
These counters, too, are already virtualized in modern VMMs such as Xen. In Xen, these return
values are calculated using a real-time clock; StopWatch uses the guest virtual time, instead.
2.4 IO clocks
IO clocks are typically network, disk and DMA interrupts. (Other device interrupts, such as
keyboards, mice, graphics cards, etc., are typically not relevant for guest VMs in clouds.) We
outline our strategy for mitigating their use to implement timing channels in Section 2.4.1, and then
in Section 2.4.2 we describe our implementation of this strategy in StopWatch .
2.4.1 Strategy
The method described in Section 2.3 for dealing with RT clocks by introducing virtual time
provides a basis for addressing sources of IO clocks. A component of our strategy for doing so is to
synchronize I/O events across the three replicas of each guest VM in virtual time, so that every I/O
interrupt occurs at the same virtual time at all replicas. Among other things, this synchronization
will force uniprocessor VMs to execute deterministically, but it alone will not be enough to interfere
with IO clocks; it is also necessary to prevent the timing behavior of one replica’s machine from
imposing I/O interrupt synchronization points for the others, as discussed in Section 2.1–2.2. This
is simpler to accomplish for disk accesses and DMA transfers since replica VMs initiate these
themselves, and so we will discuss this case first. The more difficult case of network interrupts,
where we explicitly employ median calculations to dampen the influence of any one machine’s
timing behavior on the others, will then be addressed.
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2.4.1.1 Disk and DMA interrupts
The replication of each guest VM at start time includes replicating its entire disk image, and so
any disk blocks available to one VM replica will be available to all. By virtue of the fact that (unipro-
cessor) VMs execute deterministically in StopWatch , replicas will issue disk and DMA requests at
the same virtual time. Upon receiving such a request from a replica at time V , the VMM adds an
offset ∆d to determine a “delivery time” for the interrupt, i.e., at virtual time V +∆d, and initiates
the corresponding I/O activities (disk access or DMA transfer). The offset ∆d must be large enough
to ensure that the data transfer completes by the virtual delivery time. Once the virtual delivery time
has been determined, the VMM simply waits for the first VM exit caused by the guest VM (as in
Section 2.3.2) that occurs at a virtual time at least as large as this delivery time. The VMM then
injects the interrupt prior to the next VM entry of the guest. This interrupt injection also includes
copying the data into the address space of the guest, so as to prevent the guest VM from polling for
the data in advance of the interrupt to create a form of clock (e.g., see [49, Sec 4.2.2]).
2.4.1.2 Network interrupts
Unlike the initiation of disk accesses and DMA transfers, the activity giving rise to a network
interrupt, namely the arrival of a network packet that is destined for the guest VM, is not synchro-
nized in virtual time across the three replicas of the guest VM. So, the VMMs on the three machines
hosting these replicas must coordinate to synchronize the delivery of each network interrupt to the
guest VM replicas. To prevent the timing of one from dictating the delivery time at all three, these
VMMs exchange proposed delivery times and select the median, as discussed in Section 2.2. To
solicit proposed timings from the three, it is necessary, of course, that the VMMs hosting the three
replicas all observe each network packet. So, StopWatch replicates every network packet to all three
computers hosting replicas of the VM for which the packet is intended. This is done by a logically
separate “ingress node” that we envision residing on a dedicated computer in the cloud. (Of course,
there need not be only one such ingress for the whole cloud.)
When a VMM observes a network packet to be delivered to the guest, it sends its proposed
virtual time — i.e., in the guest’s virtual time, see Section 2.3 — for the delivery of that interrupt
to the VMMs on the other machines hosting replicas of the same guest VM. (We stress that these
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proposals are not visible to the guest VM replicas.) Each VMM generates its proposed delivery
time by adding a constant offset ∆n to the virtual time of the guest VM at its last VM exit. ∆n
must be large enough to ensure that once the three proposals have been collected and the median
determined at all three replica VMMs, the chosen median virtual time has not already been passed
by any of the guest VMs. The virtual-time offset ∆n is thus determined using an assumed upper
bound on the real time it takes for each VMM to observe the interrupt and to propagate its proposal
to the others,4 as well as the maximum allowed difference between the fastest two replicas’ virtual
times. This difference can be limited by slowing the execution of the fastest replica.
Once the median proposed virtual time for a network interrupt has been determined at a VMM,
the VMM simply waits for the first VM exit caused by the guest VM (as in Section 2.3.2) that occurs
at a virtual time at least as large as that median value.5 The VMM then injects the interrupt prior to
the next VM entry of the guest. As with disk accesses and DMA transfers, this interrupt injection
also includes copying the data into the address space of the guest, so as to prevent the guest VM
from polling for the data in advance of the interrupt to create a form of clock (e.g., [49, Section 4.2.2
]).
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Figure 2.2: Delivering a packet to guest VM replicas.
The process of determining the delivery time of a network packet to a guest VM’s replicas is
pictured in Figure 2.2. This figure depicts a real-time interval [R1, R2] at the three machines at
4In distributed computing parlance, we thus assume a synchronous system, i.e., there are known bounds on processor
execution rates and message delivery times.
5If the median time determined by a VMM has already passed, then our synchrony assumption was violated by the
underlying system. In this case, that VMM’s replica has diverged from the others and so must be recovered by, e.g.,
copying the state of another replica.
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which a guest VM is replicated, showing at each machine: the arrival of a packet at the VMM, the
proposal made by each VMM, the arrival of proposals from other replica machines, the selection of
the median, and the delivery of the packet to the guest replica. Each stepped diagonal line shows
the progression of virtual time at that machine.
2.4.2 Implementation in Xen
Xen presents to each HVM guest a virtualized platform that resembles a classic PC/server plat-
form with a network card, disk, keyboard, mouse, graphics display, etc. This virtualized platform
support is provided by virtual I/O devices (device models) in Dom0, a domain in Xen with spe-
cial privileges. QEMU (http://fabrice.bellard.free.fr/qemu) is used to implement
device models. One instance of the device models is run in Dom0 per HVM domain.
2.4.2.1 Network card emulation
In the case of a network card, the device model running in Dom0 receives packets destined for
the guest VM. Without StopWatch modification, the device model copies this packet to the guest
address space and asserts a virtual network device interrupt via the virtual Programmable Interrupt
Controller (vPIC) exposed by the VMM for this guest. HVM guests cannot see real external hard-
ware interrupts since the VMM controls the platform’s interrupt controllers [50, Section 29.3.2 ].
In StopWatch , we modify the network card device model so as to place each packet destined
for the guest VM into a buffer hidden from the guest, rather than delivering it to the guest. The
device model then reads the current virtual time of the guest (as of the guest’s last VM exit), adds
∆n to this virtual time to create its proposed delivery (virtual) time for this packet, and multicasts
this proposal to the other two replicas (step 1 in Figure 2.3). A memory region shared between
Dom0 and the VMM allows device models in Dom0 to read guest virtual time.
Once the network device model receives the two proposals in addition to its own, it takes the
median proposal as the delivery time and stores this delivery time in the memory it shares with the
VMM. The VMM compares guest virtual time to the delivery time stored in the shared memory
upon every guest VM exit caused by guest VM execution. Once guest virtual time has passed the
delivery time, the network device model copies the packet into the guest address space (step 2 in
Figure 2.3) and asserts a virtual network interrupt on the vPIC prior to the next VM entry (step 3).
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Figure 2.4: Virtual inter-packet delivery times to attacker VM replicas with coresident victim (“two
baselines, one victim”) and in a run where no replica was coresident with a victim (“three baselines”)
Figure 2.4a shows the CDF of virtual inter-packet delivery times to replicas of an attacker VM
in an actual run where one replica is coresident with a victim VM continuously serving a file, in
comparison to the virtual delivery times with no victim present. This plot is directly analogous
to that in Figure 2.1a but is generated from a real StopWatch run and shows the distribution as a
CDF for ease of readability. Figure 2.4b shows the number of observations needed to distinguish
the victim and no-victim distributions in Figure 2.4a using a χ-squared test, as a function of the
desired confidence. This figure is analogous to Figure 2.1b and confirms that StopWatch strength-
ens defense against timing attacks by an order of magnitude in this scenario. Again, the absolute
number of observations needed to distinguish these distributions is likely quite conservative, owing
to numerous practical challenges to gathering these observations [97].
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2.4.2.2 Disk and DMA emulation
The emulation of the IDE disk and DMA devices is similar to the network card emulation above.
StopWatch controls when the disk and DMA device models complete requests and notify the guest.
Instead of copying data read to the guest address space, the device model in StopWatch prepares a
buffer to receive this data. In addition, rather than asserting an appropriate interrupt via the vPIC
to the guest as soon as the data is available, the StopWatch device model reads the current guest
virtual time from memory shared with the VMM, adds ∆d, and stores this value as the interrupt
delivery time in the shared memory. Upon the first VM exit caused by guest execution at which the
guest virtual time has passed this delivery time, the device model copies the buffered data into the
guest address space and asserts an interrupt on the vPIC. Disk writes are handled similarly, in that
the interrupt indicating write completion is delivered as dictated by adding ∆d to the virtual time at
which the write was initiated.
2.5 Collaborative Attacks
The mechanisms described in Section 2.3–2.4 intervene on two significant sources of clocks;
though VM replicas can measure the progress of one relative to the other, for example, their mea-
surements will be the same and will reflect the median of their timing behaviors. Moreover, by
forcing each guest VM to execute (and, in particular, schedule its internal activities) on the basis
of virtual time and by synchronizing I/O events across replicas in virtual time, uniprocessor guest
VMs execute deterministically, stripping them of the ability to leverage TL and Mem clocks, as
well. (More specifically, the progress of TL and Mem clocks are functionally determined by the
progress of virtual time and so are not independent of it.) There nevertheless remains the possibil-
ity of various collaborative attacks that leverage an attacker VM in conjunction with other attacker
components that we discuss below.
2.5.1 External Collaborators
One possible collaborative attack involves conjoining the attacker VM with a collaborator with
which it interacts that is external to the cloud and, in particular, on whose real-time clock we cannot
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intervene. By interacting with the attacker VM, the external collaborator might attempt to discern
information using the real-time behavior of his attacker VM.
Because guest VM replicas will run deterministically, they will output the same network pack-
ets in the same order. StopWatch uses this property to interfere with a VM’s ability to exfiltrate
information on the basis of its real-time behavior as seen by an external observer. StopWatch does
so by adopting the median timing across the three guest VM replicas for each output packet. The
median is selected at a separate “egress node” that is dedicated for this purpose (c.f., [90]), anal-
ogous to the “ingress node” that replicates every network packet destined to the guest VM to the
VM’s replicas (see Section 2.4). Like the ingress node, there need not be only one egress node for
the whole cloud.
To implement this scheme in Xen, every packet sent by a guest VM replica is tunneled by the
network device model on that machine to the egress node. The egress node forwards an output
packet to its destination after receiving the second copy of that packet (i.e., the same packet from
two guest VM replicas). Since the second copy of the packet it receives exhibits the median output
timing of the three replicas, this strategy ensures that the timing of the output packet sent toward its
destination is either the timing of a guest replica not coresident with the victim VM or else a timing
that falls between those of guest replicas not coresident with the victim.
An alternative strategy that the external collaborator might take is to send real-time timestamps
to his attacker VM, in the hopes of restoring a notion of real-time to that VM (that was stripped away
as described in Section 2.3). Again, however, since each packet to the attacker VM is delivered
on a schedule dictated by the median progress of the attacker VM replicas (Section 2.4), those
timestamps will reflect only on the behavior of the median replica. As such, it matters little whether
the external collaborator sends real-time timestamps to the attacker VM or the attacker VM sends
virtual-time timestamps (or events reflecting them) to the external collaborator; either way, the
power offered by the external collaborator is the same, namely relating progress of the median
progress of the attacker VM replicas to real time.
2.5.2 Collaborating Victim-VM Clients
While the type of external collaborator addressed in Section 2.5.1 interacts with the attacker
VM, a more powerful collaborator is one that might additionally interact with the victim VM, e.g.,
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as one of its clients. This possibility raises the issue of remote timing attacks (e.g., [16]) that do not
involve coresidence of attacker VMs with victim VMs at all; such attacks are not our concern here,
as we are motivated only by access-driven attacks.
That said, recent investigations have paired remote timing attacks with access-driven elements:
e.g., Bates et al. [7] and Herzberg et al. [47] developed attacks by which a victim-VM’s client
could detect the impact of a coresident attacker-VM’s communication on the timing of the victim’s
communication to it, thereby confirming the coresidence of the attacker VM with the victim VM,
for example.
While the goal of StopWatch is not to defend against all remote timing attacks, it does mitigate
the access-driven elements of attacks such as those of Bates et al. and Herzberg et al. Specifically,
in StopWatch the observable timing of a victim VM’s communication to its clients will be dictated
by the median progress of its three replicas (Section 2.5.1). As shown in Section 2.2.3, this reveals
quantifiably less information to the client than the observable impact of a coresident attacker VM
on a (non-replicated) victim VM would. In particular, an attacker VM could perturb the victim
VM’s observable communication timings only if it is coresident with the victim VM replica whose
progress is the median of the victim’s three replicas, and only then constrained above and below
according to the other replicas’ progress.
The defenses suggested by Herzberg et al. to the attack they investigate include a rate-limiting
firewall that interferes with the remote attacker’s ability to induce load on VMs hosted in the cloud.
Our ingress node (Section 2.4.1.2) could trivially be adapted to rate-limit inbound traffic, as well, as
a secondary defense against such attacks.
2.5.3 Collaborating Attacker VMs
Another possible form of attacker collaboration involves multiple attacker VMs working to-
gether to mount access-driven timing attacks. The apparent risks of such collaboration can be seen
in the following possibility: replicas of one attacker VM (“VM1”) reside on machines A, B, and
C; one replica of another attacker VM (“VM2”) resides on machine A; and a replica of the victim
VM resides on machine C. If VM2 induces significant load on its machines, then this may slow
the replica of VM1 on machine A to an extent that marginalizes its impact on median calculations
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among its replicas’ VMMs. The replicas of VM1 would then observe timings influenced by the
larger of the replicas on B and C — which may well reflect timings influenced by the victim.
Mounting such an attack, or any collaborative attack involving multiple attacker VMs on one
machine, appears to be difficult, however. Just as argued above that an attacker VM detecting its
coresidence with a victim VM is made much harder by StopWatch , one attacker VM detecting
coresidence with another using timing covert channels would also be impeded. If the cloud takes
measures to avoid disclosing coresidence of one VM with another by other channels, it should be
difficult for the attacker to even detect when he is in a position to mount such an attack or to interpret
the results of mounting such an attack indiscriminately.
If such attacks are nevertheless feared, they can be made harder still by increasing the num-
ber of replicas of each VM. If the number were increased from three to, say, five, then inducing
sufficient load to marginalize one attacker replica from its median calculations would not substan-
tially increase the attacker’s ability to mount attacks on a victim. Rather, the attacker would need to
marginalize multiple of its replicas, along with accomplishing the requisite setup to do so.
2.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the performance of our StopWatch prototype. We present addi-
tional implementation details that impact performance in Section 2.6.1, our experimental setup in
Section 2.6.2, and our tests and their results in Section 2.6.3–2.6.4.
2.6.1 Selected Implementation Details
Our prototype is a modification of Xen version 4.0.2-rc1-pre, amounting to insertions or changes
of roughly 1500 source lines of code (SLOC) in the hypervisor. There were also about 2000 SLOC
insertions and changes to the QEMU device models distributed with that Xen version. In addition to
these changes, we incorporated OpenPGM (http://code.google.com/p/openpgm/) into
the network device model in Dom0. OpenPGM is a high-performance reliable multicast implemen-
tation, specifically of the Pragmatic General Multicast (PGM) specification [81]. In PGM, reliable
transmission is accomplished by receivers detecting loss and requesting retransmission of lost data.
OpenPGM is used in StopWatch for replicating ethernet packets destined to a guest VM to all of
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that VM’s replicas and for communication among the VMMs hosting guest VM replicas. We also
extended the network device model on a host to tunnel each ethernet packet emitted from a local
VM replica to the appropriate egress node (see Section 2.5.1) over a persistent TCP connection.
Recall from Section 2.4 that each VMM proposes (via an OpenPGM multicast) a virtual deliv-
ery time for each network interrupt, and the VMMs adopt the median proposal as the actual delivery
time. As noted there, each VMM generates its proposal by adding a constant offset ∆n to the cur-
rent virtual time of the guest VM. ∆n must be large enough to ensure that by the time each VMM
selects the median, that virtual time has not already passed in the guest VM. However, subject to
this constraint, ∆n should be minimized since the real time to which ∆n translates imposes a lower
bound on the latency of the interrupt delivery. (Note that because ∆n is specified in virtual time
and virtual time can vary in its relationship to real time, the exact real time to which ∆n translates
can vary during execution.) We selected ∆n to accommodate timing differences in the arrivals of
packets destined to the guest VM at its three replicas’ VMMs, the delays for delivering each VMM’s
proposed virtual delivery time to the others, and the maximum allowed difference in progress be-
tween the two fastest guest VM replicas (which StopWatch enforces by slowing the fastest replica,
if necessary). For the platform used in our experiments (see Section 2.6.2) and under diverse net-
working workloads, we found that a value of ∆n that typically translates to a real-time delay in the
vicinity of 7-12ms sufficed to meet the above criteria. The analogous offset ∆d for determining the
virtual delivery time for disk and DMA interrupts was determined based on the maximum observed
disk access times and translates to roughly 8-15ms.
2.6.2 Experimental setup
Our “cloud” consisted of three machines with the same hardware configuration: 4 Intel Core2
Quad Q9650 3.00GHz CPUs, 8GB memory, and a 70GB rotating hard drive. Dom0 was config-
ured to run Linux kernel version 2.6.32.25. Each HVM guest had one virtual CPU, 2GB memory
and 16GB disk space. Each guest ran Linux kernel 2.6.32.24 and was configured to use the Pro-
grammable Interrupt Controller (PIC) as its interrupt controller and a Programmable Interrupt Timer
(PIT) of 250Hz as its clock source. The Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller (APIC) was
disabled. An emulated ATA QEMU disk and a QEMU Realtek RTL-8139/8139C/8139C+ were
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provided to the guest as its disk and network card. In each of our tests, we installed an application
(e.g., a web server or other program) in the guest VM, as will be described later.
After the guest VM was configured, we copied it to our three machines and restored the VM at
each. In this way, our three replicas started running from the same state. In addition, we copied the
disk file to all three machines to provide identical disk state to the three replicas.
Once the guest VM replicas were started, inbound packets for this guest VM were replicated to
all three machines for delivery to their replicas as discussed in Section 2.4. These three machines had
100Mb/s ethernet connectivity via a NetGear FS108 switch. They were part of a /24 subnet within
the UNC campus network. Broadcast traffic on the network (e.g., ARP requests) was replicated for
delivery as in Section 2.4. These broadcasts averaged roughly 50-100 packets per second. As such,
this background activity was present throughout our experiments and is reflected in our numbers.
Since a cloud operator would presumably place the replicas of each VM in close network proximity
to one another so as to minimize the networking penalties of coordinating across those machines,
we believe that our doing likewise provides a reasonable approximation of the networking costs that
StopWatch might encounter in practice.
2.6.3 Network Services
In this section we describe tests involving network services deployed on the cloud. In all of
our tests, our client that interacted with the cloud-resident service was a Lenovo T400 laptop with
a dual-core 2.8GHz CPU and 2GB memory attached to an 802.11 wireless network on the UNC
campus.
2.6.3.1 File downloads
Our first experiments tested the performance of file download by the client from a web server
in the cloud. The total times for the client to retrieve files of various sizes over HTTP are shown in
Figure 2.5. This figure shows tests in which our guest VM ran Apache version 2.2.14, and the file
retrieval was from a cold start (and so file-system caches were empty). The “HTTP Baseline” curve
in Figure 2.5 shows the average latency for the client to retrieve a file from an unmodified Xen guest
VM. The “HTTP StopWatch” curve shows the average cost of file retrieval from our StopWatch
implementation. Every average is for ten runs. Note that both axes are log-scale.
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Figure 2.5: HTTP and UDP file-retrieval latency.
Figure 2.5 shows that for HTTP download, a service running on our current StopWatch pro-
totype loses less than 2.8× in download speed for files of 100KB or larger. Diagnosing this cost
reveals that the bottleneck, by an order of magnitude or more, was the network transmission delay
(vs. disk access delay) in both the baseline and for StopWatch . Moreover, the performance cost of
StopWatch in comparison to the baseline was dominated by the time for delivery of inbound packets
to the web-server guest VM, i.e., the TCP SYN and ACK messages in the three-way handshake, and
then additional acknowledgments sent by the client. Enforcing a median timing on output packets
(Section 2.5.1) adds modest overhead in comparison.
This combination of insights, namely the detriment of inbound packets (mostly acknowledg-
ments) to StopWatch file download performance and the fact that these costs so outweigh disk
access costs, raises the possibility of recovering file download performance using a transport pro-
tocol that minimizes packets inbound to the web server, e.g., using negative acknowledgments or
forward error correction. Alternatively, an unreliable transport protocol with no acknowledgments,
such as UDP, could be used; transmission reliability could then be enforced at a layer above UDP
using negative acknowledgments or forward error correction. Though TCP does not define negative
acknowledgments, transport protocols that implement reliability using them are widely available,
particularly for multicast where positive acknowledgments can lead to “ack implosion.” Indeed,
recall that the PGM protocol specification [81], and so the OpenPGM implementation that we use,
ensures reliability using negative acknowledgments.
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Figure 2.6: Tests of NFS server using nhfsstone
To illustrate this point, in Figure 2.5 we repeat the experiments using UDP to transfer the file.6
The “UDP Baseline” curve shows the performance using unmodified Xen; the “UDP StopWatch”
curve shows the performance using StopWatch . Not surprisingly, baseline UDP shows performance
comparable to (but slightly more efficient than, by less than a factor of two) baseline TCP, but rather
than losing an order of magnitude, UDP over StopWatch is competitive with these baseline numbers
for files of 100KB or more.
2.6.3.2 NFS
We also set up a Network File System (NFSv4) server in our guest VM. On our client machine,
we installed an NFSv4 client; remotely mounted the filesystem exported by the NFS server; per-
formed file operations manually; and then ran nfsstat on the NFS server to print its server-side
statistics, including the mix of operations induced by our activity. We then used the nhfsstone
benchmarking utility to evaluate the performance of the NFS server with and without StopWatch .
nhfsstone generates an artificial load with a specified mix of NFS operations. The mix of NFS
operations used in our tests was the previously extracted mix file.7 In each test, the client machine
ran five processes using the mounted file system, making calls at a constant rate ranging from 25 to
400 per second in total across the five client processes.
6We are not advocating UDP for file retrieval generally but rather are simply showing the advantages for StopWatch
of a protocol that minimizes client-to-server packets. We did not use OpenPGM in these tests since the web site (as
the “multicast” originator) would need to initiate the connection to the client; this would have required more substantial
modifications. This “directionality” issue is not fundamental to negative acknowledgments, however.
7This mix was 11.37% setattr, 24.07% lookup, 11.92% write, 7.93% getattr, 32.34% read and 12.37%
create.
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The average latency per operation is shown in Figure 2.6a. In this figure, the horizontal axis is
the rate at which operations were submitted to the server; note that this axis is log-scale. Figure 2.6a
suggests that an NFS server over StopWatch incurs a less than 2.7× increase in latency over an
NFS server running over unmodified Xen. Since the NFS implementation used TCP, in some sense
this is unsurprising in light of the file download results in Figure 2.5. That said, it is also perhaps
surprising that StopWatch ’s cost increased only roughly logarithmically as a function of the offered
rate of operations. This modest growth is in part because StopWatch schedules packets for delivery
to guest VM replicas independently — the scheduling of one does not depend on the delivery of
a previous one, and so they can be “pipelined” — and because the number of TCP packets from
the client to the server actually decreases per operation, on average, as the offered load grows
(Figure 2.6b).
2.6.4 Computations
In this section we evaluate the performance of various computations on StopWatch that may
be representative of future cloud workloads. For this purpose, we employ the PARSEC bench-
marks [11]. PARSEC is a diverse set of benchmarks that covers a wide range of computations that
are likely to become important in the near future (see http://parsec.cs.princeton.edu/
overview.htm). Here we take PARSEC as representative of future cloud workloads.
We utilized the following five applications from the PARSEC suite (version 2.1), providing each
the “native” input designated for it. ferret is representative of next-generation search engines for
non-text document data types. In our tests, we configured the application for image similarity search.
blackscholes calculates option pricing with Black-Scholes partial differential equations and is
representative of financial analysis applications. canneal is representative of engineering appli-
cations and uses simulated annealing to optimize routing cost of a chip design. dedup represents
next-generation backup storage systems characterized by a combination of global and local compres-
sion. streamcluster is representative of data mining algorithms for online clustering problems.
Each of these applications involves various activities, including initial configuration, creating a lo-
cal directory for results, unpacking input files, performing its computation, and finally cleaning up
temporary files.
30
 0
 1000
 2000
 3000
 4000
 5000
 6000
 7000
 8000
ferret
blackscholes
canneal
dedup
stream
cluster
T
im
e 
(m
s)
Baseline
171 177
1530
3730
290
StopWatch
350 401
3230
5754
382
(a) Average runtimes
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
ferret
blackscholes
canneal
dedup
stream
cluster
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
d
is
k
 i
n
te
rr
u
p
ts
31 38
183
293
27
(b) Disk interrupts
Figure 2.7: Tests of PARSEC applications
We ran each benchmark ten times in one guest VM over unmodified Xen, and then ten more
times with three guest VM replicas over StopWatch . Figure 2.7a shows the average runtimes of
these applications in both cases. In this figure, each application is described by two bars; the
black bar on the left shows its performance over unmodified Xen, and the gray bar on the right
shows its performance over StopWatch . StopWatch imposed an overhead of at most 2.3× (for
blackscholes) to the average running time of the applications. Owing to the dearth of network
traffic involved in these applications, the overhead imposed by StopWatch is mostly due to the over-
head involved in intervening on disk I/O (see Section 2.4). As shown in Figure 2.7b, there is a
direct correlation between the number of disk interrupts to deliver during the application run and
the performance penalty (in absolute terms) that StopWatch imposes. If the computers in our ex-
periments used solid-state drives (versus hard disks), we conjecture that their reduced access times
would permit us to shrink ∆d and so improve the performance of StopWatch for these applications.
2.7 Comparison to Alternatives
In this section we pause to compare StopWatch to two alternatives for defending against timing
side-channels of the form we consider here. The two alternatives we consider, neither of which
involves VM replication at all, is (i) overcoming timing side-channels by the injection of random
noise, and (ii) temporally isolating guest VMs by time slicing each node and running only one guest
VM at a time on the node, resetting the machine to as clean a state as possible between each. We
discuss these alternatives in Section 2.7.1 and Section 2.7.2, respectively.
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The purpose of our comparisons is to illustrate certain advantages that StopWatch has over these
alternatives, but not to argue that StopWatch is superior to these alternatives in all ways. Indeed,
it is appropriate to point out that StopWatch ’s approach comes with several deployment overheads
that these alternatives do not suffer. For example, StopWatch requires VM replication and the
placement of each VM’s replicas so that the replicas of any VM are coresident with nonoverlapping
sets of (replicas of) other VMs, a nontrivial placement constraint discussed further in Section 2.8.
Moreover, for any VM for which networking performance is important, the VM replicas should be
placed in close network proximity to one another (as we discussed in Section 2.6.2). The cloud
must additionally provide (not necessarily physically distinct) ingress nodes for replicating inbound
traffic to each VM’s replicas (Section 2.4), and egress nodes for hiding timing information in the
traffic (the replicas of) each VM sends to others (Section 2.5.1). Neither of the alternatives discussed
below impose such additional requirements.
2.7.1 Comparison to Uniformly Random Noise
An alternative to StopWatch is simply adding random noise (without replicating VMs) to con-
found timing attacks. To illustrate advantages that StopWatch ’s approach has over this alternative,
we borrow notation first introduced in Section 2.2.3: Let X1 denote a random variable representing
the “baseline” timing behavior observed by an attacker VM (replica) in the absence of the victim
of interest, and let X ′1 be the random variable as observed by the attacker VM when it is coresident
with the victim VM of interest. Again, in StopWatch , the adversary learns information from the
difference between (i) the distribution of X2:3 for random variables X1, X2, X3 corresponding to
attacker VM replicas that are not coresident with a victim VM of interest, and (ii) the distribution
of X ′2:3 for random variables X ′1, X2, X3 where X ′1 corresponds to an attacker VM that is coresi-
dent with the victim VM of interest. More specifically, in the case where X2:3 or X ′2:3 denotes the
logical time of a network interrupt delivery, for example, the adversary observes either X2:3 +∆n
or X ′2:3 +∆n. (∆n is discussed in Section 2.4.1.2.)
For simplicity, suppose that X1 and X ′1 are exponentially distributed with rate parameters λ and
λ′, respectively, as in the example of Figure 2.1. For the random variable XN representing added
noise, assume that XN is drawn uniformly from [0, b] (i.e., XN ∼ U(0, b)), a common choice to
mitigate timing channels (e.g., [49, 39]).
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Figure 2.8: Expected delay induced by StopWatch vs. by uniform noise, as a function of confidence
with which attacker distinguishes the two distributions (coresident victim or not) after the same
number of observations; baseline distribution Exp(λ), λ = 1; victim distribution Exp(λ′)
We calculated expected delay imposed by StopWatch and by adding uniformly distributed
noise. To make a fair comparison, we configured both approaches to provide the same strength
of defense against timing attacks. Specifically, after calculating the number of observations the at-
tacker requires in the case of StopWatch to distinguish, for a fixed confidence level, the distributions
X2:3 + ∆n and X ′2:3 + ∆n using a χ-squared test, we calculated the minimum b that would give
the attacker the same confidence in distinguishing X1 + XN and X ′1 + XN after that number of
observations. Figure 2.8 shows the resulting expected delays in each case.
This figure indicates that StopWatch scales much better as the attacker’s required confidence
and the distinctiveness of the victim grows (as represented by λ′ dropping). The delay of the Stop-
Watch approach is tied most directly to ∆n, which is added to ensure that the replicas of each VM
remain synchronized (see Section 2.4.1.2); here we calculated it so that Pr[|X1 − X ′1| ≤ ∆n] ≥
0.9999. That is, the probability of a desynchronization at this event is less than 0.0001. Note that
E[X2:3+∆n] and E[X ′2:3+∆n] are nearly the same in Figure 2.8, since their difference is how the
attacker differentiates the two, and similarly for E[X1 +XN] and E[X ′1 +XN].
2.7.2 Comparison to Time Slicing
In this section, we compare StopWatch to another alternative, namely time slicing, to defend
against timing attacks. Here, “time slicing” refers to executing each VM (without replication) in
isolation for a period of time. When multiple VMs coreside on the same physical machine, they
are scheduled to run in a one-at-a-time fashion. Specifically, time is divided into slices, and within
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sliceLen (s) cleanseLen (s)
Flush-A 0.4 0.001
Flush-B 2 0.2
Flush-C 2.5 0.25
Table 2.1: Length of time slice (sliceLen) and of cleansing (cleanseLen)
each time slice, only one VM is allowed to execute, exclusively occupying all physical resources.
VMs are scheduled to consume time slices according to a round-robin scheduler (i.e., in turns). In
addition, each two consecutive time slices are separated by a cleansing period within which we
cleanse shared components in the system to simulate a machine reset. As an example, Figure 2.9
depicts the execution of three time-sliced VMs running on the same machine.
t
VM1 VM2 VM3 VM1 VM2 VM3
Start of Cleansing
End of Cleansing
Cleansing Period
Figure 2.9: Time-sliced execution of three VMs
2.7.2.1 Design
To make VMs execute in turns, we unpause virtual CPUs (vCPUs) of one VM and leave vC-
PUs of all the other VMs paused for the duration of a time slice. In this experiment, we designed
three sets of cleansing operations, described below and summarized in Table 2.1, to flush shared
components in the system with varying degrees of thoroughness. Even our most aggressive cleans-
ing operation falls short of a complete machine reset since there are some shared components (e.g.,
shared network stack of the host machine) with state that could carry information about one VM to
another. For each type of cleansing operation described below, we set the length of each time slice
(sliceLen) to be larger than the length of the cleansing period (cleanseLen) by at least one order of
magnitude, in an effort to limit the impact of cleansing periods.
Flush-A: CPU caches and TLB In the “Flush-A” cleansing operation, we use the WBINVD instruc-
tion to flush CPU instruction and data caches. WBINVD writes back all modified (instruction and
data) cache lines in the processor’s internal cache to main memory and invalidates (flushes) the inter-
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nal caches. The instruction then directs external caches to be invalidated and to write back modified
data, though there are no external caches on our machines in this experiment. In our experiment,
WBINVD is invoked at the beginning of each cleansing period, as depicted in Figure 2.9.
The TLB (Translation Lookaside Buffer) stores translations between virtual addresses and phys-
ical addresses. It gets flushed every time a context switch happens and CR3 register is reloaded. The
flushing of the TLB is automatically carried out by the virtualization software we use (Xen).
When we choose the length of the cleansing period (cleanseLen), we choose a value that is big
enough to pause/unpause vCPUs (about 0.8ms in total on our machines) and to complete all flushing
operations. In Flush-A, we use sliceLen = 0.4s and cleanseLen = 0.001s. (In contrast, Xen’s CPU
schedule quantum is 30ms.)
Flush-B: Flush-A + Disk page cache The disk page cache is a buffer of disk-backed pages kept in
main memory (RAM) by the operating system for quicker access. All physical memory that is not
directly allocated to applications is usually used by the operating system for the page cache. For a
VM running on Xen, the disk device is virtualized and provided by a device model process running
in Dom0. QEMU [8] is used to implement such device models which, by default, uses write-through
caching for all block devices (see http://wiki.qemu.org/download/qemu-doc.html).
This means that the page cache of Dom0 will be used to read and write data. To flush the disk
page cache, we use a SYNC system call followed by writing to /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches.
SYNC writes all dirty cache pages to the disk, while writing to /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
frees all the page caches for reading. In Flush-B, in addition to the CPU and TLB caches, we flush
the disk page cache as well, which takes about 185ms in our system. In this case, we set sliceLen
= 2.0s and cleanseLen = 0.2s.
Flush-C: Flush-B + On-drive disk cache buffer The disk cache buffer is the embedded memory
in a hard drive acting as a buffer between the rest of the computer and the physical hard disk plat-
ter that is used for storage. We use the utility hdparm -F, which takes roughly 25ms, to flush
this buffer in addition to operations included in Flush-B. In this case, we set sliceLen = 2.5s and
cleanseLen = 0.25s.
35
VM (replicas) per host
total hosts total VMs vanilla Xen time slicing StopWatch
Baseline 3 1 0 or 1 N/A 1
Config-1 13 26 2 2 6
Config-2 19 57 3 3 9
Config-3 25 100 4 4 12
Table 2.2: Configurations
2.7.2.2 Evaluation
To fairly compare the performance of VMs running under StopWatch and in a time-slicing
fashion, we first configure our system carefully so that the same number of VMs are running on the
same number of physical machines in both modes. For instance, given 13 machines, if each is time
sliced by two VMs, then there are 26 VMs running in total. StopWatch can also support 26 VMs (78
replicas in total) with 13 machines, each of which hosts 6 distinct replicas without violating Stop-
Watch ’s placement constraints. We have three configurations in this evaluation, shown in Table 2.2,
as well as a “Baseline” configuration in which there is at most one VM (replica) per host. In all tests,
one “target VM” is serving files via HTTP; half of the other VMs (if any, and rounding up if nec-
essary) with which it is coresident are serving NFS with a workload described below; and the rest
are receiving light ICMP traffic (i.e., being ping’ed). All VMs in this experiment are uniprocessor
VMs. The machines used to support these experiments are as described in Section 2.6.2.
In Figure 2.10a we compare the performance of the target VM serving files via HTTP in the
time slicing and StopWatch cases. Specifically, the target VM serves a file of size 100MB via
HTTP. In these tests, the downloading client was a machine sitting on the same campus network
as the nodes hosting these VMs, with a wired connection. The y-axis shows the slowdown factor,
which is computed by dividing the time taken to fetch the file from the target VM running in either
StopWatch or time sliced mode by the “vanilla Xen” value for that configuration. Each shown data
point is the average over ten such downloads.
To help explain results shown in Figure 2.10a, in Figure 2.11 we show the progress of download-
ing for various setups. (Flush-B is not shown, since it largely overlays Flush-C.) Even in Flush-A,
the download speed suffers both from frequent context switches among VMs and from CPU cache
flushing. While in Flush-C, which has longer time slices, the download speed roughly recovers
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Figure 2.10: StopWatch vs. time slicing: comparison of slowdown and delay
within one slice from a cleaned cache, the slice ends shortly thereafter. And also due to the longer
time slices, stepped effects become more obvious in Flush-C.
Finally, in Figure 2.10b we confirm these effects by measuring the latency of highly interactive
NFS operations. An NFS server was set up in the target VM, and the client remotely mounted
the exported partition and then launched grep operations, trying to find a target string in a 32B
file. grep operations were conducted with a frequency of 10 ops/s, and the average latency to
perform 200 grep operations is reported. In this experiment, the effects observed in the HTTP
case manifest themselves as paused grep commands owing to the NFS server not being scheduled
yet and so being unable to respond.
2.7.3 Discussion
The above analyses are not meant to conclude the StopWatch will always provide superior per-
formance to adding random noise or time slicing hosts, nor do we believe that is the case. For
example, machines with few physical cores and a compute-intensive, batch workload would almost
certainly perform better with time slicing than it would with StopWatch , since StopWatch would
triplicate the computations on machines allowing minimal concurrency. That said, the above analy-
ses do illustrate ways in which StopWatch can outperform these alternative designs, while providing
an arguably more holistic defense against timing channels than either of them.
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Figure 2.11: Progress of file download via HTTP
2.8 Replica Placement in the Cloud
StopWatch requires that the three replicas of each guest VM are coresident with nonoverlapping
sets of (replicas of) other VMs. This constrains how a cloud operator places guest VM replicas on
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its machines. In this section we clarify the significance of these placement constraints in terms
of the provider’s ability to best utilize its infrastructure. After all, if under these constraints, the
provider were able to simultaneously run a number of guest VMs that scales, say, only linearly in
the number of cloud nodes, then the provider should forgo StopWatch and simply run each guest
VM (non-replicated) in isolation on a separate node. Here we show that the cloud operator is not
limited to such poor utilization of its machines. We show some main theorems first and then show
their proofs with lemmas.
If the cloud has n machines, then consider the complete, undirected graph (clique) Kn on n
vertices, one per machine. For every guest VM, the placement of its three replicas forms a triangle
in Kn consisting of the vertices for the machines on which the replicas are placed and the edges
between those vertices. The placement constraints of StopWatch can be expressed by requiring that
the triangles representing VM replica placements be pairwise edge-disjoint. As such, the number
of guest VMs that can simultaneously be run on a cloud of n machines is the same as the number
of edge-disjoint triangles that can be packed into Kn. A corollary of a result due to Horsley [48,
Thm. 1.1] is:
Theorem 3. A maximum packing of Kn with pairwise edge-disjoint triangles has exactly k trian-
gles, where: (i) if n is odd, then k is the largest integer such that 3k ≤ (n2) and (n2) − 3k 6∈ {1, 2};
and (ii) if n is even, then k is the largest integer such that 3k ≤ (n2)− n2 .
So, a cloud of n machines using StopWatch can simultaneously execute k = Θ(n2) guest VMs.
The existence of such a placement, however, does not guarantee an efficient algorithm to find it.
Moreover, this theorem ignores machine capacities. Below we address both of these shortcomings.
Under the constraints of StopWatch , one node in a cloud of n nodes can simultaneously execute
up to n−12 guest VMs, since the other replicas of the guest VMs that it executes (two per VM) must
occupy distinct nodes. If each node has resources to simultaneously execute c ≤ n−12 guest VMs,
then the following theorem provides for an algorithm to efficiently place them subject to the per-
machine capacity constraint c.
Theorem 4. Let n ≡ 3 mod 6 and c ≤ n−12 . If c ≡ 0 or 1 mod 3, then there is an efficient
algorithm to place k ≤ 13cn guest VMs. If c ≡ 2 mod 3, then there is an efficient algorithm to place
k ≤ 13 (c− 1)n +
n−3
6 guest VMs.
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A limitation of Theorem 4 is that it provides an efficient algorithm to place Θ(cn) VMs only in
the case that all VMs consume one unit of machine capacity. In this sense, the theorem is simplistic,
since VMs submitted to clouds frequently have different demands for some resources. For exam-
ple, if the capacity c represents physical memory, then different VMs may have different memory
demands. The following theorem provides for an efficient placement of VMs even in this case.
Theorem 5. Let n = 6v + 3, and 2v + 1 = 3q for some q ∈ N. Suppose that each machine has
capacity c ≤ n−12 and each VM guest has a constant associated demand on that capacity of at most
dmax . There is an efficient algorithm to place Θ( cdmax n) VM guests.
Next we prove these theorems and some lemmas required to do so.
Let (Z2v+1,⊕) denote the cyclic group of addition modulo 2v + 1 for v ∈ N, and let pi :
Z2v+1 → Z2v+1 be a bijection satisfying pi(i⊕ i) = i for all i ∈ Z2v+1. (Note that i⊕ i 6= i′⊕ i′ for
any i, i′ ∈ Z2v+1, i 6= i′, since 2v+1 is odd. As such, pi is well defined.) Let} : Z2v+1×Z2v+1 →
Z2v+1 be defined by i } i′ = pi(i ⊕ i′). Then, } is idempotent (i } i = i for all i ∈ Z2v+1) and
commutative (i} i′ = i′} i for all i, i′ ∈ Z2v+1). Moreover, for any i, i′ ∈ Z2v+1, i′′ = pi−1(i′)ª i
satisfies i} i′′ = i′, and so (Z2v+1,}) is an idempotent, commutative quasigroup.
Lemma 1. Fix any t, 1 ≤ t ≤ v. Then, Z2v+1 =
⋃
i∈Z2v+1
{i} (i⊕ t)}.
Proof.
Z2v+1 =
⋃
i∈Z2v+1
{i⊕ i} =
⋃
i∈Z2v+1
{i⊕ i⊕ t} =
⋃
i∈Z2v+1
{pi(i ⊕ i⊕ t)} =
⋃
i∈Z2v+1
{i} (i⊕ t)}
Proof of Theorem 4. Following Bose’s construction of a Steiner Triple System [58, Section 1.2], let
n = 6v + 3 and let (Z2v+1,}) be the idempotent commutative quasigroup of order 2v + 1 defined
above. Let Z2v+1 × {0, 1, 2} denote the n nodes, and consider the following sets Gt, 0 ≤ t ≤ v, of
triangles:
G0 =
⋃
0≤i≤2v
{{(i, 0), (i, 1), (i, 2)}}
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and for 1 ≤ t ≤ v,
Gt =
⋃
0≤i≤2v
0≤`≤2
{{(i, `), (i ⊕ t, `), (i } (i⊕ t), `+ 1 mod 3)}}
There are 2v + 1 triangles in G0 and (2v + 1) × 3 = 6v + 3 = n triangles in Gt for each
1 ≤ t ≤ v. Moreover, all of these triangles are edge-disjoint [58, Section 1.2]. Triangles in G0 visit
each of the n nodes exactly once. Triangles in any Gt, 1 ≤ t ≤ v, visit each node (i∗, `∗) exactly
three times: when i∗ = i and `∗ = `; when i∗ = i ⊕ t and `∗ = `; and when i∗ = i } (i ⊕ t) and
`∗ = `+ 1 mod 3. And due to the fact that (Z2v+1,}) is an idempotent, commutative quasigroup,
these three times are distinct. Due to Lemma 1, i}(i⊕t) also iterates through the members of Z2v+1
exactly once (i.e., Z2v+1 =
⋃
i∈Z2v+1
{i } (i ⊕ t)}). So, collectively the triangles in G0, . . . , Gv
visit each node 3v + 1 = n−12 ≥ c times.
So, if c ≡ 0 mod 3, then we can place k ≤ 13cn VMs using the
1
3cn triangles in groups
G1, . . . , Gc/3. If c ≡ 1 mod 3, then we can place k ≤ 13cn VMs by first using the 2v + 1 =
n
3
triangles in G0 and then the 13(c− 1)n triangles in G1, . . . , G(c−1)/3. If c ≡ 2 mod 3, then we can
place k ≤ 13(c − 1)n +
n−3
6 VMs by first using the 2v + 1 =
n
3 triangles in G0, then
1
3(c − 2)n
triangles in G1, . . . , G(c−2)/3 , and finally any v = n−36 triangles from Gv that visit each node at
most one time (e.g., {(i, 0), (i ⊕ v, 0), (i } (i⊕ v), 1)} for 0 ≤ i ≤ v − 1).
From this point forward, we fix the bijection pi to be
pi(i) =


i/2 if i ≡ 0 mod 2
(i+ 2v + 1)/2 otherwise
Lemma 2. If 2v + 1 ≡ 0 mod 3m, then:
• If i ≡ 3m−1 mod 3m, then pi(i) ≡ 2 · 3m−1 mod 3m.
• If i ≡ 2 · 3m−1 mod 3m, then pi(i) ≡ 3m−1 mod 3m.
Proof. Since 2v + 1 ≡ 0 mod 3m by assumption, we know that 2v + 1 = b · 3m for some b ∈ N.
We first prove if i ≡ 3m−1 mod 3m, then pi(i) ≡ 2 ·3m−1 mod 3m. Note that if i ≡ 3m−1 mod 3m,
then i = a · 3m + 3m−1 for some a ∈ N.
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1. If a is odd and so a = 2a′ + 1 for some a′ ∈ N, then i = (2a′ + 1)3m + 3m−1 = 2a′ ·
3m + 3m + 3m−1 = 2a′ · 3m + (3 + 1)3m−1. In particular, note that i is even. As a result,
pi(i) = i/2 = a′ · 3m + 2 · 3m−1 and so pi(i) ≡ 2 · 3m−1 mod 3m.
2. If a is even and so a = 2a′ for some a′ ∈ N, then i = (2a′)3m + 3m−1, which is odd. Then
pi(i) = (i+ 2v+ 1)/2 = (2a′ · 3m + 3m−1 +2v +1)/2 = a′ · 3m + 3
m−1+2v+1
2 = a
′ · 3m +
3m−1+b·3m
2 = a
′ ·3m+ 3b+12 ·3
m−1
. Note that b must be odd, i.e., b = 2b′+1 for some b′ ∈ N.
So we have pi(i) = a′·3m+ 6b′+42 ·3
m−1 = a′·3m+3b′·3m−1+2·3m−1 = (a′+b′)3m+2·3m−1.
So, pi(i) ≡ 2 · 3m−1 mod 3m.
Now we prove that if i ≡ 2 · 3m−1 mod 3m, then pi(i) ≡ 3m−1 mod 3m. Note that if i ≡
2 · 3m−1 mod 3m, then i = a · 3m + 2 · 3m−1 for some a ∈ N.
1. If a is even and so a = 2a′ for some a′ ∈ N, then i = (2a′)3m + 2 · 3m−1. So, pi(i) = i/2 =
a′ · 3m + 3m−1 and thus pi(i) ≡ 3m−1 mod 3m.
2. If a is odd and so a = 2a′ + 1 for some a′ ∈ N, then i = (2a′ + 1)3m + 2 · 3m−1. Then
pi(i) = (i+2v+1)/2 = ((2a′+1) ·3m+2·3m−1+2v+1)/2 = a′ ·3m+3m−1+ 3
m+2v+1
2 =
a′ ·3m+3m−1+ 3
m+b·3m
2 = a
′ ·3m+3m−1+ b+12 ·3
m
. Note that b must be odd, i.e., b = 2b′+1
for some b′ ∈ N. So we have pi(i) = a′ ·3m+3m−1+(b′+1) ·3n = (a′+b′+1) ·3m+3m−1
and thus pi(i) ≡ 3m−1 mod 3m.
Lemma 3. Fix any i, i′ ∈ Z2v+1. Then for any k, 0 ≤ k ≤ 2v, (i⊕ k)} (i′ ⊕ k) = (i} i′)⊕ k.
Proof. We show that for any k, 0 ≤ k ≤ 2v, that (i⊕k⊕1)} (i′⊕k⊕1) ≡ ((i⊕k)} (i′⊕k))⊕1.
We consider four cases:
• If (i⊕k)⊕(i′⊕k) is even and (i⊕k⊕1)⊕(i′⊕k⊕1) is even, then pi((i⊕k)⊕(i′⊕k))⊕1 =
i⊕k⊕i′⊕k
2 ⊕ 1 =
i⊕k⊕1⊕i′⊕k⊕1
2 = pi((i⊕ k ⊕ 1)⊕ (i
′ ⊕ k ⊕ 1)).
• If (i⊕k)⊕(i′⊕k) is odd and (i⊕k⊕1)⊕(i′⊕k⊕1) is odd, then pi((i⊕k)⊕(i′⊕k))⊕1 =
(i⊕k)⊕(i′⊕k)+2v+1
2 ⊕ 1 =
(i⊕k⊕1)⊕(i′⊕k⊕1)+2v+1
2 = pi((i ⊕ k ⊕ 1)⊕ (i
′ ⊕ k ⊕ 1)).
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• If (i⊕k)⊕(i′⊕k) is odd and (i⊕k⊕1)⊕(i′⊕k⊕1) is even, then (i⊕k)⊕(i′⊕k) = 2v−1
and (i⊕ k ⊕ 1)⊕ (i′ ⊕ k ⊕ 1) = 0. So, pi((i⊕ k)⊕ (i′ ⊕ k))⊕ 1 = 2v−1+2v+12 ⊕ 1 = 0 =
pi((i ⊕ k ⊕ 1)⊕ (i′ ⊕ k ⊕ 1)).
• If (i⊕ k)⊕ (i′⊕ k) is even and (i⊕ k⊕ 1)⊕ (i′⊕ k⊕ 1) is odd, then (i⊕ k)⊕ (i′⊕ k) = 2v
and (i ⊕ k ⊕ 1) ⊕ (i′ ⊕ k ⊕ 1) = 1. So, pi((i ⊕ k) ⊕ (i′ ⊕ k)) ⊕ 1 = 2v2 ⊕ 1 = v ⊕ 1 =
1+2v+1
2 = pi((i⊕ k ⊕ 1)⊕ (i
′ ⊕ k ⊕ 1)).
So, for any k, 0 ≤ k ≤ 2v, we have that (i⊕ k ⊕ 1)} (i′ ⊕ k ⊕ 1) ≡ ((i⊕ k)} (i′ ⊕ k))⊕ 1.
Therefore, for any k, 0 ≤ k ≤ 2v, (i⊕ k)} (i′ ⊕ k) ≡ (i} i′)⊕ k.
Lemma 4. Let n = 6v + 3 and 2v + 1 = 3q for some q ∈ N. Let Z2v+1 × {0, 1, 2} denote the n
nodes, and consider the following sets Gt, 1 ≤ t ≤ v, of triangles:
Gt =
⋃
0≤i≤2v
0≤`≤2
{{(i, `), (i ⊕ t, `), (i } (i⊕ t), `+ 1 mod 3)}}
For each Gt, 1 ≤ t ≤ v, there exists a set Ht ⊂ Gt of 2v + 1 triangles that partition the n nodes.
Proof. To define the subgroup Ht of triangles, we first introduce some variables based on group
index t, 1 ≤ t ≤ v. Let m ∈ N be the maximum value such that 3m−1 | t; therefore, t ≡
3m−1 mod 3m or t ≡ 2 · 3m−1 mod 3m. Then the subgroup of triangles that partition the n nodes
is defined as:
Ht =
⋃
i∈Z2v+1 : i≡0 mod 3m,
0≤k<3m−1, 0≤`≤2
{{(i⊕k, `), (i⊕ t⊕k, `), (((i⊕k)} (i⊕ t⊕k)), `+1 mod 3)}} (2.2)
To show that (2.2) partitions the nodes, it suffices to show that
Z2v+1 =
⋃
i∈Z2v+1 : i≡0 mod 3m,
0≤k<3m−1
{i⊕ k, i⊕ t⊕ k, (i ⊕ k)} (i⊕ t⊕ k)} (2.3)
Since 2v + 1 = 3q , we have v < 3q . And since t ≤ v, t < 3q . Because 3m−1 | t, we have
3m−1 ≤ t < 3q and so m ≤ q. Let p = q −m. First, we have:
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⋃
i∈Z2v+1 : i≡0 mod 3m,
0≤k<3m−1
{i⊕ k} =
⋃
0≤a<3p,
0≤k<3m−1
{a · 3m + k} (2.4)
Now suppose t satisfies t ≡ 3m−1 mod 3m. (The case of t ≡ 2 · 3m−1 mod 3m is similar.)
Denoting t = b · 3m + 3m−1 for some 0 ≤ b < 3p, we have:
⋃
i∈Z2v+1 : i≡0 mod 3m,
0≤k<3m−1
{i⊕ t⊕ k} =
⋃
0≤a<3p,
0≤k<3m−1
{(a · 3m)⊕ (b · 3m + 3m−1)⊕ k}
=
⋃
0≤a<3p,
0≤k<3m−1
{(a+ b mod 3p) · 3m + 3m−1 + k}
=
⋃
0≤c<3p,
0≤k<3m−1
{c · 3m + 3m−1 + k} (2.5)
Equation 2.5 follows from the fact that Z3p = {a+ b mod 3p}0≤a<3p . Moreover,
⋃
i∈Z2v+1 : i≡0 mod 3m,
0≤k<3m−1
{(i⊕ k)} (i⊕ t⊕ k)}
=
⋃
i∈Z2v+1 : i≡0 mod 3m,
0≤k<3m−1
{(i } (i⊕ t))⊕ k} (2.6)
=
⋃
0≤a<3p,
0≤k<3m−1
{pi((a · 3m)⊕ (a · 3m)⊕ (b · 3m + 3m−1))) ⊕ k}
=
⋃
0≤a<3p,
0≤k<3m−1
{pi(((2a + b mod 3p) · 3m) + 3m−1)⊕ k}
=
⋃
0≤c<3p,
0≤k<3m−1
{c · 3m + 2 · 3m−1 + k} (2.7)
Equation 2.6 follows from Lemma 3 with i′ = i ⊕ t. Equation 2.7 follows from Lemma 2 and the
facts that (i) Z3p = {2a + b mod 3p}0≤a<3p , and (ii) pi is a bijection.
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Each of the sets in Equation 2.4, Equation 2.5, and Equation 2.7 has size 3m−1 · 3p, and they
clearly do not intersect. So, put together they have size 3p+m = 3q = 2v + 1. So, Equation 2.3
holds true, and Equation 2.2 defines 2v + 1 triangles that exactly partition the n nodes.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let (Z2v+1,}) be the idempotent commutative quasigroup defined above, and
let Z2v+1 × {0, 1, 2} denote the n nodes. Consider the following sets Gt, 0 ≤ t ≤ v, of triangles:
G0 =
⋃
0≤i≤2v
{{(i, 0), (i, 1), (i, 2)}}
and for 1 ≤ t ≤ v,
Gt =
⋃
0≤i≤2v
0≤`≤2
{{(i, `), (i ⊕ t, `), (i } (i⊕ t), `+ 1 mod 3)}}
As proved in Lemma 4, each Gt, 1 ≤ t ≤ v, contains a subset Ht ⊂ Gt of triangles that
partition the n nodes. Let H0 = G0; this group of triangles also partitions the n nodes. Moreover,
note that the triangles in H0, . . . ,Hv are all edge-disjoint, because all of the triangles in G0, . . . , Gv
are [58, Section 1.2]. Therefore, ⋃0≤t≤v Ht contains (v + 1)(2v + 1) edge-disjoint triangles that
visit each node v + 1 times. VMs can then be placed on any of these triangles that visit each node
no more than min{v + 1, c/dmax } times. Since v + 1 = Θ(n) and cdmax = O(n) the number of
VMs that can be placed is Θ( cdmax n).
2.9 Conclusion
We proposed a new method to address timing side channels in IaaS compute clouds that em-
ploys three-way replication of guest VMs and placement of these VM replicas so that they are
coresident with nonoverlapping sets of (replicas of) other VMs. By permitting these replicas to ob-
serve only virtual (vs. real) time and the median timing of network events across the three replicas,
we suppress their ability to glean information from a victim VM with which one is coresident. We
described an implementation of this technique in Xen, yielding a system called StopWatch , and we
evaluated the performance of StopWatch on a variety of workloads. Though the performance cost
for our current prototype ranges up to 2.8× for networking applications, we used our evaluation
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to identify the sources of costs and alternative application designs (e.g., reliable transmission us-
ing negative acknowledgments, to support serving files) that can enhance performance considerably.
We also extended this evaluation to demonstrate workloads for which StopWatch provides better
performance than alternatives that leverage commodity hardware, namely adding random noise to
observable event timings and eliminating concurrent VM execution (time slicing). We showed that
clouds with n machines capable of each running c ≤ n−12 guest VMs simultaneously can efficiently
schedule Θ(cn) guest VMs under the constraints of StopWatch , or Θ( cndmax ) guest VMs if each
guest VM makes demands on the per-machine capacity c of at most dmax . These results represent a
clear improvement over the alternative of running each guest VMs on its own machine. We envision
StopWatch as a basis for a high-security cloud, e.g., suitable for military, intelligence, or financial
communities with high assurance needs.
An important topic for future work is extending StopWatch to support multiprocessor guest
VMs. As discussed in Section 2.1, previous research on deterministic scheduling (e.g., [27]) should
provide a basis for extending our current StopWatch prototype. A second direction for improve-
ment is that we have implicitly assumed in our StopWatch implementation — and in many of our
descriptions in this chapter — that the replicas of each VM are placed on a set of homogeneous
nodes. Expanding our implementation to heterogeneous nodes poses additional challenges that we
hope to address in future work.
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CHAPTER 3 REPLICA PLACEMENT FOR AVAILABILITY IN THE WORST CASE
In this chapter, we consider the problem of deploying replicas of objects onto a system of
physical nodes so as to ensure the survival of as many objects as possible when node failures occur.
This general problem occurs in practice in many computing contexts: the “objects” might be virtual
machines, files, or servers, and the “replicas” could be whole object copies or merely components
used in the implementation of the object. The survival of an object is achieved provided that fewer
than a given threshold number of its replicas were placed on the nodes that fail. This threshold
might range from all of the object replicas to only a few. The question we address in this chapter is:
How should the object replicas be placed on the nodes (aside from the obvious requirement that the
replicas of an object all be placed on different nodes)?
Upon encountering this problem for the first time, it might not be immediately obvious that the
placement matters. But consider the possibility that all of the failed nodes host replicas of mostly
the same objects. This scenario might fail objects that require many replica failures to do so, but
it fails fewer objects than it otherwise could if each object fails when only a few of its replicas do.
Alternatively, suppose the failed nodes host replicas of mostly different objects. Then, many objects
might fail if only few object replica failures suffice to fail each object, but fewer objects might fail
if many replica failures per object are required. As this contrast suggests, the placement certainly
matters and depends not only on the number of nodes, the number of objects, the number of node
faults, and the replicas per object, but also the number of an object’s replicas’ failures that prove
fatal to the object.
We are not the first to study the problem of object replica placement for availability (see Sec-
tion 3.1 for a discussion of related work), but to our knowledge, our treatment is novel in at least
two ways. First, we consider a worst-case adversary that fails a specified number of nodes with
knowledge of how object replicas were placed on nodes, so as to maximize the number of objects
failed. This is in contrast to failures that occur probabilistically, for example. Second, by decoupling
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the number of replicas per object from the number of replica failures that disable each object, our
framework allows for treatment of a wide variety of object configurations, such as objects that are
accessed using majority quorums (e.g., [38, 36]) so that a majority of available replicas is required
for the object to survive, or objects for which even just a single surviving replica suffices to keep
the object available (e.g., in the primary-backup(s) approach [17]).
Our study is also general by virtue of what it leaves unspecified. While we label nodes, replicas
and objects as “failed” or not, we remain agnostic to the fault model [79] (crash, Byzantine, etc.).
Indeed, our interest in this problem arose from our work for using virtual machine replication as a
defense against timing side-channels in an infrastructure-as-a-service compute cloud [57] (detailed
in Chapter 2), without attention to actual faults at all. Similarly, the protocols run among object
replicas or for objects to interact with others are not our concern here. Rather, we simply assume
that a node failure fails all of the object replicas it hosts, and that an object fails once a specified
number of its object replicas do. We also do not constrain the means by which the adversary fails
the nodes it chooses to, whether that be disabling them by denial-of-service attacks, leveraging
vulnerabilities in object replicas they host, physically attacking the nodes, etc.
In this context, we make the following contributions:
• We study the viability of block designs for replica placements. Specifically, we first leverage
t-packings (e.g., see [61]), a relaxation of Steiner systems, as a replica placement strategy. We
provide a lower bound for the availability of these replica placements and show that they already
offer availability that is c-competitive with optimal placements (for a factor c that we specify).
This suggests that t-packings are a useful starting point for constructing placement strategies.
• We develop a placement strategy that improves on the use of t-packings in isolation by combining
them. We present an efficient algorithm to compute combinations of individual t-packings that
maximize our lower bound on availability (among any such combination) for a given number
of node failures. We further demonstrate that for a range of practical parameter values, the
placement strategy derived for a given target number of failures provides good availability even
for different numbers of failures.
• We develop as our primary comparison point a placement strategy of randomly placing replicas
on nodes subject to a load-balancing requirement, owing to the popularity of this strategy in
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previous work. We characterize availability for this placement strategy in our adversarial model,
and then we develop an expression for the limit of this measure as the number of objects grows.
We further show that this limit already closely reflects reality for practical parameter values and
relatively small numbers of objects, allowing it to be used as a basis to compare to the availabil-
ities offered by our strategies based on t-packings. In this way, we show that our constructions
based on t-packings provide better availability for ranges of practical parameter values than does
random replica placement.
As discussed above, the replica placement strategies that we explore build from t-packings, and
some of our analysis depends on use of maximum t-packings (also called t-designs). Based on
current knowledge of t-designs (which we briefly survey in Section 3.2.3), we limit our attention to
replication scenarios involving up to five replicas per object. Fortunately, this decision is not limiting
for practical replication scenarios in data centers: VM replication for fault tolerance typically uses
two (e.g., [86]) and many file systems default to three or four replicas per file or related structure
(as in GFS [37], Hadoop [80], and FARSITE [2]).
3.1 Related Work
Replica placement for availability (or durability) has been extensively studied in various fields
(e.g., [12, 31, 10, 93, 68, 91, 9, 75]), sometimes in conjunction with other concerns. All related
work we have located focuses on leveraging node failure distributions, especially their independence
and/or heterogeneity as would be common in peer-to-peer storage and computing, for example.
Here we make no assumptions about node failure distributions, allowing them to be controlled by
an arbitrary adversary constrained only by the number of nodes he can fail. This renders our analysis
both simpler in many cases and, at the same time, very general.
We nevertheless draw from this work where possible. Notably, at PODC 2007, Yu and Gib-
bons [91] explored the following question: If each node fails independently with fixed probability
and if all replicas of an object must fail for the object to fail, then what placement strategy offers the
highest probability of success for operations involving multiple objects, a given number of which
must be available for the operation to succeed? Their finding that we most directly leverage here is
their identification of random replica placements as offering close to the best probability of opera-
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tion success when an operation can tolerate some object failures. Together with the widespread use
and empirical study of random placements (e.g., [76, 2, 10, 37, 92, 59]), this finding motivates our
choice of random replica placement as a comparison point for our proposed placement strategies
in Section 3.3. That said, for drawing this comparison we need to develop our own analysis of
the availability of random placements, since we focus on a worst-case adversary that can choose
which nodes to fail; this analysis might be of interest in its own right. Our work also differs from
Yu and Gibbons’ in that we do not consider multi-object operations, asking instead only how many
objects remain available, but we do so while permitting an object to remain available only if a spec-
ified number of its replicas survive (versus just one of them). Note that equating our “objects” to
their “operations” and our “replicas” to their “objects” (each with only one replica) does not yield
the same problem—even setting aside our different adversarial models—since replicas of the same
object in our case must be placed on different nodes, while their objects do not.
As discussed earlier, the cornerstone of the replica placement strategy we develop is a t-packing.
To our knowledge, we are the first to explore the use of t-packings for replica placement in dis-
tributed systems. That said, such block designs have found application in several diverse domains,
as surveyed elsewhere (e.g., [22, 20, 71]). To our knowledge, the most conceptually related use
of block designs to our problem is their use in constructing quorum systems (e.g., [65]). Quorum
systems, however, must intersect, whereas we have no such requirement here for object placements,
a fact that we leverage.
3.2 Overlap-Based Placement Strategies
The strength of random replica placement in diminishing the likelihood that random node
failures will fail many objects (see Section 3.1) derives from it inducing low inter-object corre-
lation [91], a measure that reflects the overlaps of objects’ replica placements. However, random
placement induces small overlaps only probabilistically, allowing the possibility that targeted node
failures could still impact many objects. In this section we explore “overlap-based” placement strate-
gies that manage these overlaps explicitly. We will return to analyzing the impact of targeted node
failures on random placements in Section 3.3 and compare to our overlap-based strategies there.
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b The number of objects
r The number of replicas per object
s The number of an object’s replicas
whose failure fails the object; 1 ≤ s ≤ r
n The number of nodes
k The number of failed nodes; s ≤ k < n
pi A placement
O The set of all objects; |O| = b
N The set of all nodes; |N | = n
Figure 3.1: Notation
Before continuing, we first define some notation used in the rest of this document (see Fig-
ure 3.1). We presume a system of n nodes denoted by the set N (|N | = n). These nodes will host
a set O of b objects (|O| = b), each replicated r times. This hosting is represented by a placement
pi : O → 2N , where 2N is the power set of N . Specifically, for each obj ∈ O, pi(obj) is a subset
of N of size |pi(obj)| = r that indicates the nodes on which replicas of obj are located. We use k
to denote the number of nodes that fail. If K ⊆ N is the set of k failed nodes, then an object obj is
said to fail if and only if |pi(obj) ∩ K| ≥ s. This gives rise to the following natural definition of the
availability of a placement pi.
Definition 1. For any fixed placement pi, let Avail (pi) denote the number of available objects, min-
imized over all sets K of (potentially failed) nodes where |K| = k. In other words,
Avail (pi) = min
K⊆N :
|K|=k
|{obj ∈ O : |pi(obj) ∩ K| < s}|
3.2.1 The SimpleOverlap(x, λ) Placement Strategy
Our intuition for developing a replica placement strategy so as to maximize availability is simply
to limit the number of objects whose replicas overlap on the same nodes “too much.” This intuition
is captured in the SimpleOverlap(x, λ) strategy, which limits overlaps of more than x nodes to at
most λ objects. We limit our attention to x < s, since once x ≥ s, arbitrarily many objects can
overlap on s nodes in a SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement, meaning that failures of those nodes could
fail arbitrarily many objects.
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Definition 2. The SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement strategy locates object replicas on nodes so that
for all N ′ ⊆ N where |N ′| = x+1 and all O′ ⊆ O, if on every node inN ′ is placed replicas of all
objects in O′, then |O′| ≤ λ.
So, for example, if λ = 1, then the replicas of any two objects can overlap on at most x nodes.
It is important to note that a SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement exists only for limited values of
b, once n and r are fixed. Specifically, from design theory results, where a SimpleOverlap(x, λ) is
otherwise known as a (x+ 1)-(n, r, λ)-packing (e.g., [61]), we have:
Lemma 5 e.g., [61]. A SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement exists only if b ≤
⌊
λ
(
n
x+1
)
/
(
r
x+1
)⌋
.
While b ≤
⌊
λ
( n
x+1
)
/
( r
x+1
)⌋
is necessary for a SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement, it is not sufficient.
To achieve a sufficient condition, we select an nx ≤ n and a µx of which λ is a multiple (i.e.,
µx | λ), as a function of x (and r, which we generally consider a constant) so that µx
(
nx
x+1
)
/
(
r
x+1
)
is integral and, moreover, a SimpleOverlap(x, µx) placement exists for any b ≤ µx
( nx
x+1
)
/
( r
x+1
)
objects. Then, a SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement on nx nodes can be obtained by “copying” the
SimpleOverlap(x, µx) placement λ/µx times.
Observation 1. If there exist an nx ≤ n and a µx | λ so that a SimpleOverlap(x, µx) place-
ment exists for all b ≤ µx
( nx
x+1
)
/
( r
x+1
)
, then a SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement exists for all b ≤
λ
(
nx
x+1
)
/
(
r
x+1
)
.
Observation 2. Placing replicas on only nx ≤ n nodes can lead to a load-imbalanced system, but
only slightly if we can find a suitable nx ≈ n. If we cannot, then we can instead identify values nx1,
. . ., nxm such that
∑m
i=1 nxi ≤ n but
∑m
i=1 nxi ≈ n, and then extend the results below to account
for building a SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement on
∑m
i=1 nxi nodes for any b ≤
∑m
i=1 λ
( nxi
x+1
)
/
( r
x+1
)
objects from a SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement on each chunk of nxi nodes.
The extension in Observation 2 is straightforward but tedious, and so we defer its discussion to
Section 3.2.3. For now, we simply assume that a suitable nx and µx exist and can be found to
support Observation 1. We also adopt the convention that, given nx, µx, r, s, and b, λ is chosen
minimally, so that
(λ − µx)
( nx
x+1
)
( r
x+1
) < b ≤ λ
( nx
x+1
)
( r
x+1
) (3.1)
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Figure 3.2: Avail (pi)− lbAvail so(x, λ) for n = 71, x = 1, and r = 3
We now briefly characterize the availability of SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placements, to justify their
use as a building block for a more useful placement strategy in Section 3.2.2. The key observation
in characterizing the availability of SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placements is that the availability can be
lower-bounded by applying Lemma 5 to packing s-sized sets of replicas into the k failed nodes, as
shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 6. For any SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement pi, Avail (pi) ≥ lbAvail so(x, λ) where
lbAvail so(x, λ) = b−
⌊
λ
(
k
x+1
)
(
s
x+1
)
⌋
(3.2)
Proof. An upper bound on the number of objects that become unavailable due to the failure of nodes
in K is simply the number of objects for which s replicas can be packed onto the nodes K under
the constraints of a SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement, i.e., in a SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement using
only s replicas per object (versus r) and only k nodes (versus n). Adapting Lemma 5 accordingly,
we get that at most
⌊
λ
( k
x+1
)
/
( s
x+1
)⌋
objects become unavailable.
lbAvail so(x, λ) is a tight lower bound for some but not all parameter values, as indicated in
Figure 3.2. In this figure, Avail (pi) was calculated explicitly after placing objects according to a
SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement pi and then simulating the worst k failures.
This lower bound for Avail (pi), together with Equation 3.1, permits us to relate Avail (pi) to the
availability of any placement pi′—and so, in particular, one offering optimal availability.
Theorem 6. For constant n, x (and so nx, µx), r, s, and k, define constants c =
[
1−
( rx+1)(
k
x+1)
( nxx+1)(
s
x+1)
]−1
and α = cµx
( kx+1)
( sx+1)
. For any number b of objects, any SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement pi, and any
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other placement pi′,
Avail (pi′) < c · Avail (pi) + α
In this respect, SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placements are “c-competitive” (c.f., [14]) with optimal place-
ments.
Proof. First note that Equation 3.1 implies
λ
b
<
( r
x+1
)
( nx
x+1
) + µx
b
(3.3)
By Lemma 6,
Avail (pi)
Avail (pi′)
≥
b−
⌊
λ
( kx+1)
( sx+1)
⌋
b
≥
b− λ
( kx+1)
( sx+1)
b
= 1−
λ
b
( k
x+1
)
( s
x+1
) > 1−
(( r
x+1
)
( nx
x+1
) + µx
b
)(( k
x+1
)
( s
x+1
)
)
where the last step is simply substituting Equation 3.3. Rearranging, we get
Avail (pi′)− c · Avail (pi) <
(
Avail (pi′)
b
)
α ≤ α
where c and α are as given in the theorem statement.
To see an illustration of Theorem 6, suppose that s = r so that
( r
x+1
)
and
( s
x+1
)
cancel. Then,
c =
[
1−
( r
x+1
)( k
x+1
)
( nx
x+1
)( s
x+1
)
]−1
=
[
1−
k(k − 1) · · · (k − x)
nx(nx − 1) · · · (nx − x)
]−1
≤
[
1−
(
k
nx
)x+1]−1
So, for example, if
(
k
nx
)x+1
= 0.2, then the availability of a SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement is
1.25-competitive with the availability offered by an optimal placement. On the other hand, under
other conditions (such as when s is small relative to r), this constant factor can be less favorable.
3.2.2 The ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) Placement Strategy
The previous section illustrated the potential utility of SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placements, but we
stopped short of suggesting exactly how to select x. To see why this may not be straightforward,
consider a fixed n, r, s, and k, but consider increasingly large values of b. On the one hand, if x is
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held constant, then the value λ must grow linearly with b, due to Equation 3.1. This, however, im-
plies that the (lower bound on) availability in Lemma 6 also diminishes linearly. On the other hand,
if x is increased so that λ need not be, then this increases the values of b that can be accommodated
exponentially (assuming each nx ≈ n and r ¿ n); to accommodate some values of b, though, this
huge increase is unnecessary and results in a larger penalty to availability than increasing λ would
have.
In this section we develop a new placement strategy, called ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1), that
provides us the flexibility to tune parameters λ0, . . . , λs−1 corresponding to the possible values of
x, 0 ≤ x < s, to best match a given b. That is, ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) takes a value λx
corresponding to each x, 0 ≤ x < s, subject to the constraint
b ≤
s−1∑
x=0
λx
(
nx
x+1
)
(
r
x+1
) (3.4)
and then divides the objects over placements SimpleOverlap(0, λ0), . . . ,SimpleOverlap(s− 1, λs−1).
Equation 3.4 ensures that ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) can accommodate all b objects, since each
SimpleOverlap(x, λx) placement can accommodate λx
( nx
x+1
)
/
( r
x+1
)
of them (see Observation 1).
Definition 3. A ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placement strategy locates object replicas on nodes
by placing up to λx
( nx
x+1
)
/
( r
x+1
)
objects according to a SimpleOverlap(x, λx) placement for each
x ≥ 0.
Lemma 7. For any ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placement pi, Avail (pi) ≥ lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1)
where
lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1) = b−
s−1∑
x=0
⌊
λx
( k
x+1
)
( s
x+1
)
⌋
(3.5)
Proof. Under a ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placement, each SimpleOverlap(x, λx) placement
accounts for placing at most λx
( nxx+1)
( rx+1)
objects, of which up to
⌊
λx
( kx+1)
( sx+1)
⌋
might be rendered unavail-
able by k node failures, as in Lemma 6. As such, at most
∑s−1
x=0
⌊
λx
( kx+1)
( sx+1)
⌋
objects can be rendered
unavailable in total by k node failures. Since only b objects can be placed, the result follows.
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3.2.2.1 Computing a ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) to Maximize lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1)
To maximize availability using ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) for a given value of k, we thus
take it as our goal to select λ0, . . . , λs−1 so as to maximize the lower bound lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1)
subject to Equation 3.4. This problem lends itself to the following recurrence for lbav (x, b′), which
denotes this maximum value of lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1) for b′ objects placed using placements
SimpleOverlap(0, λ0), . . ., SimpleOverlap(x, λx) under any selection of λ0, . . . , λx.
∀x,∀b′ ≤ 0 : lbav
(
x, b′
)
= 0 (3.6)
∀b′ > 0 : lbav
(
0, b′
)
= max
{
0, b′ −
⌊(⌈
b′
µ0
r
n0
⌉
µ0
)
k
s
⌋}
(3.7)
∀x > 0,∀b′ > 0 : lbav
(
x, b′
)
=
max
0≤d≤
⌈
b′
µx
( rx+1)
( nxx+1)
⌉
{
lbav
(
x− 1, b′ − dµx
(
nx
x+1
)
(
r
x+1
)
)
+min
{
b′, dµx
(
nx
x+1
)
(
r
x+1
)
}
−
⌊
dµx
(
k
x+1
)
(
s
x+1
)
⌋}
(3.8)
In words, Equation 3.6 encodes that zero availability can be offered if there are no objects (b′ ≤ 0).
Equation 3.7 encodes that when x = 0 the availability that can be achieved for b′ > 0 objects is that
resulting from setting λ0 =
⌈
(b′/µ0)
(r
1
)
/
(n0
1
)⌉
µ0 = d(b
′/µ0)(r/n0)eµ0 and using Lemma 6 (or
simply 0 if this value turns out to be negative). Finally, Equation 3.8 encodes that when x > 0, avail-
ability can be maximized by considering every option for λx = dµx and, for each option, adding the
availability contributed by this setting of λx (i.e., min
{
b′, λx
( nx
x+1
)
/
( r
x+1
)}
−
⌊
λx
( k
x+1
)
/
( s
x+1
)⌋)
to the availability that can be achieved for the remaining b′ − λx
( nx
x+1
)
/
( r
x+1
)
objects by optimally
setting λ1, . . . , λx−1 (i.e., lbav
(
x− 1, b′ − λx
(
nx
x+1
)
/
(
r
x+1
))).
So, lbav (s− 1, b) for a given number k of failed nodes is the maximum lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1)
that a ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placement pi can achieve. This recurrence gives rise to the nat-
ural dynamic programming algorithm (e.g., see [26, Ch. 6 ]) for choosing λ0, . . . , λs−1 that runs
O(sb) time, treating all other parameters as constants.
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Figure 3.3: lbAvail
co
(λ0,...,λs−1)
lbAvail co(λ′
0
,...,λ′s−1)
expressed as a percentage
3.2.2.2 Sensitivity to Choice of k
A potential disadvantage of the ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placement strategy, or more pre-
cisely of the algorithm described in Section 3.2.2.1 to configure λ0, . . . , λs−1 for optimal availability,
is that it does so only for the specified value k. A concern is that a ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1)
placement pi configured for k node failures might fare poorly when subjected to k′ 6= k failures,
at least in comparison to its availability were it configured for k′ failures. This could occur if the
λ0, . . . , λs−1 resulting from the configuration with k and those values resulting from configuration
with k′ were different.
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rn 2 3 4 5
31 n1 = 31 n1 = 31 [58] n1 = 28 [29] n1 = 25 [29]
n2 = 31 n2 = 28 [44] n2 = 26 [43]
n3 = 31 n3 = 23 [69]
n4 = 31
71 n1 = 71 n1 = 69 [58] n1 = 70 [29] n1 = 65 [29]
n2 = 71 n2 = 70 [44] n2 = 65 [21]
n3 = 71 n3 = 71 [69]
n4 = 71
257 n1 = 257 n1 = 255 [58] n1 = 256 [29] n1 = 245 [29]
n2 = 257 n2 = 256 [44] n2 = 257 [67]
n3 = 257 n3 = 243 [69]
n4 = 257
Figure 3.4: Values of nx used in this chapter
We have explored parameter spaces of interest to identify settings for which λ0, . . . , λs−1 would
be different when configured for k or k′ failed nodes, and then compared the resulting availabil-
ity lower bounds. Figure 3.3 shows some representative examples. This figure plots the ratio
lbAvail co(λ0,...,λs−1)
lbAvail co(λ′
0
,...,λ′s−1)
expressed as a percentage for a ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placement con-
figured for k node failures and a ComboOverlap(λ′0, . . . , λ′s−1) placement configured for k′ node
failures. As such, when k′ = k this ratio will be 100%, for example. As this plot indicates, for some
parameter values, this ratio dips below 100%, though we have not found cases in parameter regions
of interest where this ratio drops below 98%.
3.2.3 Parameter Selection
Creating a SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement for a set of n nodes can be achieved by identify-
ing an nx ≤ n and a µx that divides λ, for which µx
(
nx
x+1
)
/
(
r
x+1
)
is integral and, moreover, a
SimpleOverlap(x, µx) placement exists for any b ≤ µx
( nx
x+1
)
/
( r
x+1
)
objects (see Observation 1).
For such an nx and µx, a SimpleOverlap(x, µx) placement corresponds to a (x+ 1)-(nx, r, µx)-
design [61]. The study of the existence of such constructs is a fundamental question in design
theory (e.g., [58]).
The need for µx to divide λ can be discharged if µx = 1, in which case a (x+ 1)-(nx, r, µx)-
design is a Steiner system. Letting q be any prime power and for any d ≥ 2, known infinite designs
include [21]: x+ 1 = 2, r = q, and nx = qd; x+ 1 = 3, r = q + 1, and nx = qd + 1; x+ 1 = 2,
r = q + 1, and nx = qd + · · · + q + 1; x + 1 = 2, r = q + 1, and nx = q3 + 1; and x + 1 = 2,
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r = 2d, and nx = 2d+d
′
+ 2d − 2d
′ for any d′ > d. In addition, there are numerous known finite
designs for x < 5, as surveyed by Colbourn and Mathon [21]. Known designs of Steiner systems
suffice to implement SimpleOverlap(x, λ) for a wide array of practical parameter values, including
all of the parameter settings investigated in this chapter. Figure 3.4 shows the Steiner systems used
in our evaluations, as well as citations to where they can be found. (Note that when x+ 1 = r, the
constraints for a Steiner system are vacuously satisfied by sets of size r.)
As discussed in Observation 2, if a suitable nx ≈ n cannot be found, then an alternative is to
deconstruct the n nodes into “chunks” of size nx1, . . ., nxm, each admitting a SimpleOverlap(x, µxi)
placement, and to build a SimpleOverlap(x, µx) placement for µx = lcm{µx1, . . . , µxm} on
∑m
i=1 nxi
nodes by building a SimpleOverlap(x, µx) placement on each chunk of nxi nodes individually. This
observation introduces a wide range of placement options for arbitrary n. This is demonstrated in
Figure 3.5 for µx = 1, which explores possible placements when even only m = 3. Each CDF
shows the fraction of n values in the range [50, 800] for which the “capacity gap” is at most the
value on the horizontal axis, where the “capacity gap” is the difference between the ideal capacity
(i.e.,
⌊
µx
(
n
x+1
)
/
(
r
x+1
)⌋) and the capacity achievable (using concrete Steiner systems) by decompos-
ing n into up to m = 3 chunks (i.e., ∑mi=1 µxi( nxix+1)/( rx+1) with each µxi = 1) expressed as a
fraction of the ideal capacity. As shown there, in the cases r ∈ {2, 3, 4}, a very low (i.e., good)
capacity gap can be achieved for nearly all system sizes n and all values of x. This is not the case
for r = 5, however, where only about 10% of the system sizes n admit constructions (of which we
are aware) for x = 2 or x = 3 with up to m = 3 chunks that yield a reasonably small capacity gap.
One way to address difficult cases like these (i.e., r = 5 along with x = 2 or x = 3) is to simply
select one’s system size n from the fraction of possible system sizes for which a small capacity
gap can be achieved. Another alternative, however, is to expand consideration to µx > 1, in which
case numerous additional constructions are possible. Trivially, for any x + 1 ≤ r, the collection
of all r-subsets of nx nodes suffices as a SimpleOverlap(x, µx) placement for µx =
(nx−x−1
r−x−1
)
.
There are many other classes of (x+ 1)-(nx, r, µx)-designs with µx > 1, as have been surveyed
elsewhere [60, 1, 53]. In particular, Khosrovshahi and Laue [53, Table 4.3.7] survey a number of
infinite designs for 3 ≤ x+ 1 ≤ 5.
To see the power of permitting µx > 1 for realistic parameter settings, in Figure 3.6 we re-plot
the x = 2 and x = 3 cases for r = 5 but allowing µx to be µx ≤ 5 (left) or µx ≤ 10 (right). As
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Figure 3.5: CDFs showing the fraction of system sizes n ∈ [50, 800] for which the capacity gap
(indicated on the horizontal axis, where lower is better) can be achieved using up to m = 3 Steiner
systems (µxi = 1)
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Figure 3.6: Re-plot of Figure 3.5 for r = 5 and x ∈ {2, 3}, but allowing µx =
lcm{µx1, . . . , µxm} ≥ 1
can be seen in Figure 3.6, allowing µx ≤ 5 yields significant improvements in the x = 3 case, and
permitting µx ≤ 10 additionally improves the x = 2 case dramatically. As such, permitting even
modest growth of µx can greatly shrink the capacity gap in difficult cases.
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3.3 Comparison to Random Replica Placement
As discussed in Section 3.1, the work of Yu and Gibbons [91] highlighted random replica place-
ments as being very effective in ensuring the completion of multi-object operations when some
objects’ loss could be tolerated, in a system model where nodes fail independently with fixed prob-
ability. Given this result and the more general prominence of random replica placement in the
research literature, we compare the availability offered by our ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) place-
ment strategy to that offered by random replica placement. Specifically, we compare to a random
placement strategy that (as in Yu and Gibbon’s work) is load-balanced, where the average number
of replicas per node is ` = rbn .
Definition 4. The Random placement strategy locates object replicas using a placement chosen
uniformly at random from all placements that locate at most d`e replicas on each node.
3.3.1 The Worst-Case Availability of Random
Evaluating the worst-case availability of Random placement is more subtle than for our previous
placements, since any (load-balanced) placement can result from this placement strategy. So, in the
truly worst case, Random would produce the worst possible placement for availability. That said,
Random would do so with very low probability, and so this does not provide a representative view
of how Random fares.
A more representative evaluation would take into account the expected behavior of the place-
ment strategy. In some sense, the previous work of Yu and Gibbons [91] did so, but they did not
take into account the worst-case behavior of the adversary. That is, their adversary failed nodes
independently with a fixed probability, but ours adaptively chooses which nodes to fail based on
the placement. So, to quantify the availability offered by Random in this worst case, we start by
defining the vulnerability of Random:1
Definition 5. For any f , the vulnerability of Random, denoted Vuln rnd(f), is the expected number
of pairs (K,F) where K ⊆ N , |K| = k, F ⊆ O, |F| ≥ f , and at least s replicas of each object in
F are placed on the nodes in K. The expectation is taken with respect to the random choices made
by the Random placement strategy.
1Definition 5 and Definition 6 trivially generalize to any randomized placement strategy.
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If Vuln rnd(f) ≥ 1, then in expectation, there will be a set of k nodes that, if failed, will fail a
set of at least f objects. It is then natural to define the number of objects that are probably available
as follows:
Definition 6. In a Random placement, the number of objects that are probably available is
prAvail rnd = b−max{f : Vuln rnd(f) ≥ 1}
We now seek to quantify the probable availability of Random.
Theorem 7. As ` −→∞,
Vuln rnd(f) −→
(
n
k
)(
n
r
)−b b∑
f ′=f
(
b
f ′
)
α(n, k, r, s)f
′
((
n
r
)
− α(n, k, r, s)
)b−f ′
where α(n, k, r, s) =
∑min{r,k}
s′=s
(k
s′
)(n−k
r−s′
)
.
Proof. Consider a variant Random′ of the Random placement in which the r replicas of each object
are placed on r distinct nodes selected uniformly at random, but without limiting the number of
replicas placed at each node. Let Xnd,obj be an indicator random variable defined as Xnd,obj = 1 if
a replica of obj is placed at nd and Xnd,obj = 0 otherwise. Let Lnd =
∑
obj∈OXnd,obj ; i.e., Lnd is a
random variable denoting the number of replicas placed at node nd.
While Random enforces that the number of replicas placed on each node is at most d`e, Random′
allows more. Specifically, for a fixed nd, {Xnd,obj}obj∈O are independent, identically distributed
Bernoulli random variables; i.e., Xnd,obj ∼ B( rn ) for each obj ∈ O. Therefore, E (Lnd) =
br
n = `
and, applying well-known Chernoff bounds (see, e.g., [62, Corollary 4.6 ]),
P (|Lnd − `| ≥ δ`) ≤ 2e
−`δ2/3
for any 0 < δ < 1. Consequently, the distribution of object replicas to nodes under Random′
(quickly) approaches the distribution induced by Random as ` −→ ∞, and so we can reason about
the asymptotic distribution induced by Random using the one induced by Random′.
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Let failedNodes(K) denote the event that set K ⊆ N is the complete set of failed nodes, and
failedObjs(F) denote the event that the set F ⊆ O is the complete set of objects that failed due
to the failure of the nodes in K. Now, under Random′,
P
(
failedObjs(F)
∣∣ failedNodes(K))
=

 ∏
obj∈F
P
(
obj replicas placed on s′ ≥ s
nodes in K and r − s′ others
) ·

 ∏
obj∈O\F
P
(
obj replicas placed on s′ < s
nodes in K and r − s′ others
)
=

 ∏
obj∈F
min{r,k}∑
s′=s
(k
s′
)(n−k
r−s′
)
(n
r
)

 ·

 ∏
obj∈O\F
s−1∑
s′=0
(k
s′
)(n−k
r−s′
)
(n
r
)


=
(
n
r
)−bmin{r,k}∑
s′=s
(
k
s′
)(
n − k
r − s′
)
f (
s−1∑
s′=0
(
k
s′
)(
n − k
r − s′
))b−f
=
(
n
r
)−b
α(n, k, r, s)f
((
n
r
)
− α(n, k, r, s)
)b−f
(3.9)
To complete the proof, for any K ⊆ N , |K| = k, and any F ⊆ O, define an indicator random
variable XK,F as follows: XK,F = 1 if F is the set of objects failed when the nodes K fail, and
XK,F = 0 otherwise. The expected value of XK,F is then
E (XK,F ) = P
(
failedObjs(F)
∣∣ failedNodes(K))
By linearity of expectation, Vuln rnd(f) is then:
Vulnrnd(f) = E

∑
K⊆N :
|K|=k
∑
F⊆O:
|F|≥f
XK,F

 = ∑
K⊆N :
|K|=k
∑
F⊆O:
|F|≥f
E (XK,F )
Plugging in Equation 3.9 yields the result.
For the rest of this chapter, we use the limit of Vuln rnd(f) given in Theorem 7 to calculate
prAvail rnd as defined in Definition 6. By comparing prAvail rnd to simulation results for param-
eter ranges of interest that are feasible to simulate, we found that once b ≥ 600, prAvail rnd has
converged to within 10% of the empirical average of Avail (pi) for Random placements pi. So, in
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Figure 3.7: 1bprAvail
rnd for b = 38400
drawing our comparisons between Random and ComboOverlap placements, we will restrict our
attention to b ≥ 600, to be fair to Random.
Figure 3.7 plots 1bprAvail
rnd
, i.e., prAvail rnd as a fraction of b, for various values of s, r, and n
when b = 38400. Plotted in this way as a fraction of b, the curves look very similar for the various
values of b that we have explored. One takeaway from these graphs is that the case s = 1 performs
quite poorly relative to larger s (notice the vertical axes are not the same scale), and we prove in
Section 3.3.4 that this is true for Random placements in general.
3.3.2 Comparison Results
We now compare ComboOverlap and Random placements using lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1) −
prAvail rnd across a range of parameter settings, i.e., using a ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) place-
ment computed to maximize lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1) (Section 3.2.2.1). We use the limit of Vulnrnd(f)
in Theorem 7 to get prAvail rnd as defined in Definition 6. The measure lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1)−
prAvail rnd is conservative in the sense that lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1) is a lower bound, whereas
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kb 2 3 4 5 6 7
600 75 57 45 33 25 16
1200 80 70 60 52 46 40
2400 85 76 71 67 64 61
4800 77 68 62 57 53 50
9600 69 58 52 47 43 40
19200 60 48 42 37 34 31
38400 48 38 32 28 25 23
r = 2, s = 2
k
b 2 3 4 5 6 7
600 83 72 66 61 55 51
1200 75 62 53 48 42 37
2400 63 50 41 34 28 23
4800 56 44 36 30 25 20
9600 50 37 30 24 20 17
19200 40 29 23 19 15 12
38400 30 21 15 11 8 5
r = 3, s = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6 7
600 66 50 50 28 22
1200 66 20 14 -11 -27
2400 66 20 -25 -81 -100
4800 75 42 0 -42 -84
9600 80 50 23 -5 -29
19200 83 63 44 25 10
38400 85 71 60 50 40
r = 3, s = 3
k
b 2 3 4 5 6 7
600 75 62 53 47 40 34
1200 72 62 55 49 44 40
2400 62 52 44 38 33 29
4800 53 41 34 28 24 19
9600 42 32 25 20 15 11
19200 33 23 17 12 8 5
38400 25 16 11 7 4 1
r = 4, s = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6 7
600 66 20 25 9 0
1200 75 42 0 -7 -10
2400 80 50 23 -5 -34
4800 83 63 41 23 7
9600 85 71 60 48 38
19200 77 60 45 34 23
38400 76 60 48 39 31
r = 4, s = 3
k
b 4 5 6 7
600 50 33 -25 -40
1200 50 33 -25 -33
2400 66 50 0 -33
4800 66 50 16 0
9600 66 60 28 11
19200 75 0 -25 -54
38400 75 16 -50 -85
r = 4, s = 4
k
b 2 3 4 5 6 7
600 70 57 48 41 34 28
1200 60 45 35 27 21 14
2400 47 32 23 15 8 1
4800 35 20 11 4 -2 -8
9600 24 11 3 -3 -9 -14
19200 14 3 -3 -9 -15 -20
38400 7 -2 -9 -14 -19 -22
r = 5, s = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6 7
600 75 42 9 0 -5
1200 80 55 28 0 -25
2400 83 66 47 31 16
4800 75 50 28 20 12
9600 70 47 28 13 0
19200 64 42 25 12 0
38400 57 34 18 7 -1
r = 5, s = 3
k
b 4 5 6 7
600 66 50 0 -14
1200 66 50 16 0
2400 66 60 28 11
4800 75 16 -25 -41
9600 75 28 -50 -73
19200 80 37 -15 -75
38400 83 54 16 -25
r = 5, s = 4
k
b 5 6 7
600 50 33 0
1200 50 33 25
2400 50 33 25
4800 50 0 -75
9600 66 25 -40
19200 75 25 -16
38400 83 40 0
r = 5, s = 5
(a) n = 71
k
b 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
600 66 25 0 -25 -50 -75 -100
1200 66 40 14 0 -25 -40 -64
2400 75 50 33 16 0 -10 -27
4800 75 62 45 33 25 12 3
9600 80 70 60 50 42 36 30
19200 85 75 70 64 59 55 51
38400 77 64 57 50 44 40 36
r = 2, s = 2
k
b 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
600 66 50 25 9 -7 -23 -40
1200 75 57 40 28 11 0 -7
2400 80 66 53 44 34 27 20
4800 83 72 64 58 53 47 42
9600 87 80 75 70 67 64 61
19200 80 71 65 60 56 53 50
38400 71 61 54 49 45 42 39
r = 3, s = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 8
600 50 33 25 0 -16 -28
1200 50 33 25 0 -16 -28
2400 66 50 40 16 0 -12
4800 66 50 40 16 12 0
9600 66 50 50 28 22 18
19200 66 20 14 0 -16 -38
38400 75 20 9 -66 -115 -131
r = 3, s = 3
k
b 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
600 75 57 40 28 11 0 -12
1200 80 66 53 44 34 25 17
2400 83 72 64 58 51 47 41
4800 87 80 75 70 66 63 61
9600 80 71 64 60 56 52 50
19200 71 61 54 49 44 41 38
38400 61 50 42 37 33 30 27
r = 4, s = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 8
600 66 50 40 16 0 -12
1200 66 50 40 16 12 0
2400 66 50 50 28 22 18
4800 66 60 57 37 36 30
9600 75 20 25 0 -7 -12
19200 75 33 -11 -66 -75 -85
38400 80 42 9 -33 -75 -115
r = 4, s = 3
k
b 4 5 6 7 8
600 50 66 33 25 0
1200 50 66 33 25 0
2400 50 66 33 25 20
4800 50 66 50 25 20
9600 50 33 -25 -40 -50
19200 66 33 -25 -60 -133
38400 66 50 0 -33 -100
r = 4, s = 4
k
b 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
600 80 62 50 37 28 19 9
1200 83 70 62 54 48 41 36
2400 85 78 72 67 63 59 56
4800 77 68 61 55 50 46 42
9600 69 57 48 42 36 32 28
19200 63 51 43 37 32 28 25
38400 55 43 36 31 27 23 20
r = 5, s = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 8
600 66 50 40 28 12 10
1200 66 50 50 37 22 18
2400 66 60 57 44 36 35
4800 75 33 25 9 0 -5
9600 75 42 0 -53 -64 -76
19200 80 50 16 -25 -59 -100
38400 83 60 33 4 -20 -47
r = 5, s = 3
k
b 4 5 6 7 8
600 50 66 33 25 20
1200 50 66 50 40 20
2400 50 66 50 40 33
4800 66 33 -25 -40 -50
9600 66 50 0 -33 -100
19200 66 50 16 -14 -75
38400 75 60 28 0 -55
r = 5, s = 4
k
b 5 6 7 8
600 50 50 33 33
1200 50 50 33 33
2400 50 50 33 33
4800 50 33 0 -25
9600 50 33 0 -25
19200 66 50 25 0
38400 75 60 40 16
r = 5, s = 5
(b) n = 257
Figure 3.8: lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1) − prAvail rnd for an optimal ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1)
placement as a percentage of the maximum possible improvement b− prAvail rnd
prAvail rnd is only a probabilistic estimate of the number of objects that remain available under
Random and so it is not guaranteed.
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Here and elsewhere in this chapter, we use n ∈ {31, 71, 257}, both because these values span a
reasonably wide range and because suitable nx ≈ n and µx can be found for them without resorting
to Observation 2. (These are by no means the only values that meet these criteria, though.) In
particular, this means that the ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placements represented in this section
have concrete implementations. The selection of each nx (with µx = 1) is detailed in Section 3.2.3,
as is an exploration of Observation 2.
A summary of results is given in Figure 3.8, where the top (Figure 3.8a) shows the results with
n = 71 and the bottom (Figure 3.8b) shows the results with n = 257. Each portion shows a table
for 2 ≤ r ≤ 5 and 2 ≤ s ≤ r. (The case s = 1 is further discussed in Section 3.3.4.) The number
k of failed nodes is ranged over s ≤ k ≤ 7 in the n = 71 case, and over s ≤ k ≤ 8 in the
n = 257 case; both ranges encompass a substantial rate of node failures. In each table, the number
b of objects begins at b = 600 and is repeatedly doubled until it reaches b = 38400. Each table
entry indicates lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1) − prAvail rnd as a percentage of the maximum possible
improvement b − prAvail rnd that could be achieved over prAvail rnd. To ease readability, cells
where lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1) > prAvail rnd (and so ComboOverlap “wins”) are colored white;
cells where lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1) = prAvail rnd (neither ComboOverlap nor Random “wins”)
are colored light gray; and cells where lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1) < prAvail rnd (Random “wins”)
are colored dark gray.
It is evident upon a cursory glance that ComboOverlap “wins” most of the time, and the percent-
age by which it does so is often very substantial. For example, the table in the very upper-left corner
of Figure 3.8a indicates that in the case n = 71, r = 2, s = 2, b = 2400 and k = 2, ComboOverlap
guarantees to preserve the availability of 85% of the objects that will fail in expectation under
Random.
Since each ComboOverlap placement is a combination of SimpleOverlap(x, λx) placements,
in Section 3.3.3 we show the contribution of each SimpleOverlap(x, λx) placement to the final
ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placement for n = 71 (Figure 3.10) and n = 257 (Figure 3.11), as
well as for n = 31 (Figure 3.9). (The n = 31 case is excluded from discussion in this section due to
space limitations.) These figures do not show SimpleOverlap(0, λ0) placements to save space, since
they contribute so minimally. In particular, the figures exclude breakdowns when s = 2, since in this
case, only x = 1 contributes to ComboOverlap; i.e., SimpleOverlap(1, λ1) and ComboOverlap(λ1)
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are identically the same. Very briefly, we distill out the following observations from the figures in
Section 3.3.3.
• When b grows and n and x are held constant, SimpleOverlap(x, λ) availability improves rela-
tive to Random until λ has to grow to satisfy Equation 3.1. This can be seen, for example, in
the r = s = 3, x = 1 table in the upper-left corner of Figure 3.11 (n = 257). As shown
there, while λ can remain at 1 (see rightmost column of leftmost table), SimpleOverlap(x, λ)
(and so ComboOverlap, as shown in the rightmost table on the same row) “wins” more, but its
performance diminishes as λ grows.
• One way to offset the need to grow λ is to adjust x, since when k ≈ s, doing so impacts
availability only a small amount (Equation 3.2) but can allow a SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placement
to accommodate many more objects (assuming n À r). This is shown clearly in, e.g., the
r = s = 3 cases in Figure 3.9 (n = 31) and Figure 3.10 (n = 71), where moving from x = 1
to x = 2 relieves the pressure on λ to increase, allowing the advantages of ComboOverlap to be
preserved as b grows.
• Another way to slow the growth of λ is to increase n. For a fixed number b of objects and as
n grows, ComboOverlap will increasingly select to place objects using SimpleOverlap(x, λx)
placements for smaller x. To see this, compare the contributions of, e.g., x = 1 and x = 2 to the
resulting ComboOverlap placement for r = 3, s = 3 in the top rows of Figure 3.9 (n = 31) and
Figure 3.11 (n = 257). This can be explained by observing that as n and so each nx grows, the
smallest x that suffices to achieve Equation 3.1 can shrink while keeping λ the same. This, in
turn, yields better availability (Equation 3.2).
• Even at specific parameter values, ComboOverlap can outperform SimpleOverlap(x, λ) for any
single x. This is illustrated in the top row (r = 3, s = 3) of Figure 3.9, for example, in which at
b = 4800 and k ∈ {5, 6}, the ComboOverlap table includes entries (44 and 36) that exceed the
corresponding entries of any of the SimpleOverlap(x, λx) tables in its row. This occurs at a value
of b at which SimpleOverlap(2, λ2) must increase λ2 from λ2 = 1 to λ2 = 2 to satisfy Equa-
tion 3.1. In this case, it turns out to be better to build ComboOverlap using a SimpleOverlap(2, 1)
placement in conjunction with a SimpleOverlap(1, 2) placement to satisfy Equation 3.4, rather
than using a SimpleOverlap(2, 2) placement alone. This advantage of ComboOverlap is not fre-
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quently illustrated in Section 3.3.3, though testing more exhaustively with different values of b
would elicit it more.
3.3.3 Breakdown of ComboOverlap Placements
Recall that ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placement combines individual SimpleOverlap(x, λx)
placements. In this section we detail for various parameters how individual SimpleOverlap(x, λx)
placements contribute to the ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placements computed via the algorithm
described in Section 3.2.2.1, or more specifically how they contribute to the results showing the
improvement of ComboOverlap placements over Random placements in Section 3.3.2.
We demonstrate these contributions through Figures 3.9–3.11, which isolate three cases: n =
31 (Figure 3.9), n = 71 (Figure 3.10), and n = 257 (Figure 3.11). In each figure, each row
corresponds to a particular setting for r and s. The rightmost table in each row represents the
ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placement for its row’s r and s and, in the case n = 71 or n = 257,
is an exact copy of the table in Figure 3.8a or Figure 3.8b, respectively, for the same r and s.
(The n = 31 case was elided from Section 3.3.2 due to space limitations, though many of the
ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) tables for n = 31 are included in Figure 3.9.) The other tables in its
row represent SimpleOverlap(x, λx) placements for the same r and s. As in Figure 3.8, a white table
cell indicates that for the parameter settings it represents, our placement outperforms (i.e., achieves
better availability than) a Random placement; a light gray cell indicates that both perform equally
well (setting aside the conservative nature of the comparison, see Section 3.3.2); and a dark gray
cell indicates that Random provides (potentially) better availability.
3.3.4 The s = 1 Case
In our comparisons between ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) and Random placements in Sec-
tion 3.3.2, we deferred the case s = 1. In this case, a ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placement is
just a SimpleOverlap(0, λ0) placement. Our analysis in this chapter applies to the s = 1 case, and
a comparison using lbAvail co(λ0) − prAvail rnd as in Section 3.3.2 indicates that Random slightly
outperforms SimpleOverlap(0, λ0) in this measure, for the parameter values we tested. Neverthe-
less, we relegated this case to this section simply because both Random and SimpleOverlap(0, λ0)
perform poorly in this case. The following lemma formalizes this claim for Random placements.
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r = 3, s = 3
k
b 3 4 5 6 λ
600 0 -33 -30 -42 4
1200
-100 -100 -100 -100 8
2400
-166 -190 -178 -166 16
4800
-342 -287 -255 -229 31
9600
-520 -439 -357 -297 62
19200
-785 -570 -450 -366 124
38400
-1027 -713 -535 -425 248
x = 1
k
b 3 4 5 6 λ
600 75 33 0 -42 1
1200 75 50 23 0 1
2400 83 63 47 33 1
4800 71 50 31 14 2
9600 70 47 33 23 3
19200 64 45 33 24 5
38400 59 40 30 23 9
x = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6
600 75 33 0 -42
1200 75 50 23 0
2400 83 63 47 33
4800 71 50 44 36
9600 70 47 33 23
19200 64 45 33 24
38400 59 40 30 23
ComboOverlap
r = 4, s = 3
k
b 3 4 5 6 λ
600
-33 -45 -44 -42 8
1200
-128 -113 -89 -81 16
2400
-220 -178 -140 -119 32
4800
-350 -250 -191 -154 63
9600
-468 -316 -235 -184 125
19200
-635 -390 -276 -211 250
38400
-775 -448 -309 -233 499
x = 1
k
b 3 4 5 6 λ
600 83 63 44 28 1
1200 71 46 28 9 2
2400 70 47 31 17 3
4800 57 33 16 3 6
9600 45 20 3 -9 12
19200 29 5 -8 -19 24
38400 17 -3 -15 -25 47
x = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6
600 83 63 44 28
1200 71 46 28 9
2400 70 47 31 17
4800 57 33 16 3
9600 45 20 3 -9
19200 29 5 -8 -19
38400 17 -3 -15 -25
ComboOverlap
r = 4, s = 4
k
b 4 5 6 λ
600
-166 -225 -233 8
1200
-433 -420 -400 16
2400
-700 -783 -700 32
4800
-1475 -1212 -1107 63
9600
-2400 -1980 -1542 125
19200
-3471 -2871 -2214 250
38400
-5444 -3857 -2800 499
x = 1
k
b 4 5 6 λ
600 66 50 16 1
1200 33 0 -25 2
2400 25 -16 -50 3
4800
-50 -87 -130 6
9600
-140 -200 -215 12
19200
-242 -328 -344 24
38400
-422 -457 -446 47
x = 2
k
b 4 5 6 λ
600 66 -25 -150 1
1200 66 0 -87 1
2400 75 16 -50 1
4800 75 37 -15 1
9600 80 50 21 1
19200 85 64 44 1
38400 77 52 30 2
x = 3
k
b 4 5 6
600 66 50 16
1200 66 0 -25
2400 75 16 -50
4800 75 37 -15
9600 80 50 21
19200 85 64 44
38400 77 52 30
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r = 5, s = 3
k
b 3 4 5 6 λ
600
-75 -64 -48 -45 14
1200
-145 -107 -83 -68 27
2400
-231 -158 -117 -92 53
4800
-320 -204 -146 -113 105
9600
-422 -248 -172 -131 209
19200
-514 -287 -195 -146 418
38400
-590 -319 -213 -157 835
x = 1
k
b 3 4 5 6 λ
600 62 29 3 -25 3
1200 54 23 -2 -25 5
2400 37 2 -23 -44 10
4800 24 -10 -33 -54 19
9600 7 -23 -45 -63 37
19200
-8 -37 -57 -74 74
38400
-22 -48 -66 -82 148
x = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6
600 62 29 16 -4
1200 54 23 -2 -25
2400 37 2 -18 -37
4800 24 -10 -33 -52
9600 7 -23 -45 -63
19200
-8 -37 -57 -74
38400
-22 -48 -66 -82
ComboOverlap
r = 5, s = 4
k
b 4 5 6 λ
600
-250 -228 -218 14
1200
-440 -462 -378 27
2400
-783 -700 -560 53
4800
-1400 -993 -773 105
9600
-2222 -1413 -1010 209
19200
-3115 -1888 -1239 418
38400
-4294 -2340 -1457 835
x = 1
k
b 4 5 6 λ
600 25 0 -36 3
1200 0 -50 -78 5
2400
-66 -127 -150 10
4800
-171 -193 -216 19
9600
-311 -300 -293 37
19200
-469 -428 -374 74
38400
-678 -549 -452 148
x = 2
k
b 4 5 6 λ
600 75 28 -36 1
1200 80 37 -7 1
2400 66 9 -50 2
4800 57 6 -50 3
9600 33 -30 -91 6
19200 15 -57 -111 11
38400
-15 -92 -146 22
x = 3
k
b 4 5 6
600 75 28 -36
1200 80 37 -7
2400 66 9 -50
4800 57 6 -50
9600 33 -30 -91
19200 15 -57 -111
38400
-15 -92 -146
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r = 5, s = 5
k
b 5 6 λ
600
-366 -425 14
1200
-800 -900 27
2400
-1666 -1480 53
4800
-3400 -3040 105
9600
-5125 -4371 209
19200
-8260 -7737 418
38400
-
16600
-
11281 835
x = 1
k
b 5 6 λ
600 0 -50 3
1200
-66 -150 5
2400
-233 -300 10
4800
-533 -660 19
9600
-825 -957 37
19200
-1380 -1750 74
38400
-2860 -2590 148
x = 2
k
b 5 6 λ
600 66 25 1
1200 66 25 1
2400 33 -20 2
4800 0 -80 3
9600
-50 -157 6
19200
-120 -312 11
38400
-340 -500 22
x = 3
k
b 5 6 λ
600 66 -50 1
1200 66 -50 1
2400 66 -20 1
4800 66 -20 1
9600 75 14 1
19200 80 25 1
38400 80 45 1
x = 4
k
b 5 6
600 66 25
1200 66 25
2400 66 -20
4800 66 -20
9600 75 14
19200 80 25
38400 80 45
ComboOverlap
Figure 3.9: lbAvail so(x, λ) − prAvail rnd for SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placements and
lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1) − prAvail rnd for best ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placement (right
most column) when s > 2, as a percentage of the maximum possible improvement b− prAvail rnd,
when n = 31
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r = 3, s = 3
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 λ
600 66 50 50 28 22 1
1200 33 20 14 -11 -27 2
2400
-33 -60 -62 -81 -100 4
4800
-75 -100 -130 -150 -157 7
9600
-160 -225 -230 -242 -237 13
19200
-316 -354 -361 -362 -348 25
38400
-614 -614 -564 -525 -493 50
x = 1
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 λ
600 66 0 -66 -185 -288 1
1200 66 20 -42 -122 -218 1
2400 66 20 -25 -81 -150 1
4800 75 42 0 -42 -84 1
9600 80 50 23 -5 -29 1
19200 83 63 44 25 10 1
38400 85 71 60 50 40 1
x = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6 7
600 66 50 50 28 22
1200 66 20 14 -11 -27
2400 66 20 -25 -81 -100
4800 75 42 0 -42 -84
9600 80 50 23 -5 -29
19200 83 63 44 25 10
38400 85 71 60 50 40
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r = 4, s = 3
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 λ
600 33 20 25 9 0 2
1200 25 14 0 -7 -10 3
2400
-20 -50 -53 -57 -61 6
4800
-100 -118 -135 -130 -121 12
9600
-242 -242 -220 -207 -194 24
19200
-433 -380 -332 -293 -265 48
38400
-638 -540 -451 -384 -336 96
x = 1
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 λ
600 66 20 -25 -81 -150 1
1200 75 42 0 -42 -84 1
2400 80 50 23 -5 -34 1
4800 83 63 41 23 7 1
9600 85 71 60 48 38 1
19200 77 60 45 34 23 2
38400 76 60 48 39 31 3
x = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6 7
600 66 20 25 9 0
1200 75 42 0 -7 -10
2400 80 50 23 -5 -34
4800 83 63 41 23 7
9600 85 71 60 48 38
19200 77 60 45 34 23
38400 76 60 48 39 31
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r = 4, s = 4
k
b 4 5 6 7 λ
600 0 0 -25 -40 2
1200
-50 -66 -75 -66 3
2400
-100 -150 -200 -250 6
4800
-300 -400 -400 -425 12
9600
-700 -700 -757 -833 24
19200
-1100 -1500 -1400 -1427 48
38400
-2300 -2566 -2300 -2300 96
x = 1
k
b 4 5 6 7 λ
600 50 33 -25 -60 1
1200 50 33 -25 -33 1
2400 66 50 0 -33 1
4800 66 50 16 0 1
9600 66 60 28 11 1
19200 50 0 -25 -54 2
38400 25 -16 -50 -85 3
x = 2
k
b 4 5 6 7 λ
600 50 -66 -275 -600 1
1200 50 -66 -275 -483 1
2400 66 -25 -200 -483 1
4800 66 -25 -150 -337 1
9600 66 0 -114 -288 1
19200 75 0 -87 -218 1
38400 75 16 -50 -150 1
x = 3
k
b 4 5 6 7
600 50 33 -25 -40
1200 50 33 -25 -33
2400 66 50 0 -33
4800 66 50 16 0
9600 66 60 28 11
19200 75 0 -25 -54
38400 75 16 -50 -85
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r = 5, s = 3
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 λ
600 25 14 9 0 -5 3
1200
-20 -33 -42 -50 -50 6
2400
-100 -100 -110 -106 -100 12
4800
-200 -200 -185 -172 -162 24
9600
-370 -308 -271 -240 -216 47
19200
-564 -431 -362 -307 -269 93
38400
-780 -572 -454 -374 -317 185
x = 1
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 λ
600 75 42 9 -33 -75 1
1200 80 55 28 0 -25 1
2400 83 66 47 31 16 1
4800 75 50 28 20 12 2
9600 70 47 28 13 0 3
19200 64 42 25 12 0 5
38400 57 34 18 7 -1 9
x = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6 7
600 75 42 9 0 -5
1200 80 55 28 0 -25
2400 83 66 47 31 16
4800 75 50 28 20 12
9600 70 47 28 13 0
19200 64 42 25 12 0
38400 57 34 18 7 -1
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r = 5, s = 4
k
b 4 5 6 7 λ
600 0 -25 -40 -42 3
1200
-100 -150 -150 -162 6
2400
-300 -300 -328 -366 12
4800
-500 -566 -650 -600 24
9600
-1075 -1014 -1070 -933 47
19200
-1760 -1837 -1684 -1525 93
38400
-2983 -2700 -2466 -2210 185
x = 1
k
b 4 5 6 7 λ
600 66 50 0 -14 1
1200 66 50 16 0 1
2400 66 60 28 11 1
4800 50 16 -25 -41 2
9600 25 0 -50 -73 3
19200 0 -50 -92 -115 5
38400
-50 -100 -150 -178 9
x = 2
k
b 4 5 6 7 λ
600 66 -25 -200 -400 1
1200 66 -25 -150 -337 1
2400 66 0 -114 -288 1
4800 75 16 -87 -191 1
9600 75 28 -50 -133 1
19200 80 37 -15 -75 1
38400 83 54 16 -25 1
x = 3
k
b 4 5 6 7
600 66 50 0 -14
1200 66 50 16 0
2400 66 60 28 11
4800 75 16 -25 -41
9600 75 28 -50 -73
19200 80 37 -15 -75
38400 83 54 16 -25
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r = 5, s = 5
k
b 5 6 7 λ
600
-50 -33 -100 3
1200
-200 -200 -200 6
2400
-500 -500 -525 12
4800
-1100 -1100 -1150 24
9600
-1466 -1650 -1860 47
19200
-3000 -3375 -3150 93
38400
-6066 -6825 -5442 185
x = 1
k
b 5 6 7 λ
600 50 33 0 1
1200 50 33 25 1
2400 50 33 25 1
4800 0 -33 -75 2
9600 0 -50 -100 3
19200
-66 -150 -183 5
38400
-200 -350 -342 9
x = 2
k
b 5 6 7 λ
600 50 0 -133 1
1200 50 0 -133 1
2400 50 0 -75 1
4800 50 0 -75 1
9600 66 25 -40 1
19200 75 25 -16 1
38400 83 40 0 1
x = 3
k
b 5 6 7 λ
600 50 -100 -600 1
1200 50 -100 -425 1
2400 50 -100 -425 1
4800 50 -100 -425 1
9600 66 -50 -320 1
19200 75 -50 -250 1
38400 83 -20 -200 1
x = 4
k
b 5 6 7
600 50 33 0
1200 50 33 25
2400 50 33 25
4800 50 0 -75
9600 66 25 -40
19200 75 25 -16
38400 83 40 0
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Figure 3.10: lbAvail so(x, λ) − prAvail rnd for SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placements and
lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1) − prAvail rnd for best ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placement (right
most column) when s > 2, as a percentage of the maximum possible improvement b− prAvail rnd,
when n = 71
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r = 3, s = 3
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 8 λ
600 50 33 25 0 -16 -28 1
1200 50 33 25 0 -16 -28 1
2400 66 50 40 16 0 -12 1
4800 66 50 40 16 12 0 1
9600 66 50 50 28 22 18 1
19200 33 20 14 0 -16 -38 2
38400 0 -60 -18 -66 -115 -131 4
x = 1
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 8 λ
600 50 -33 -150 -300 -483 -700 1
1200 50 -33 -150 -300 -483 -700 1
2400 66 0 -100 -233 -400 -600 1
4800 66 0 -100 -233 -337 -522 1
9600 66 0 -66 -185 -288 -409 1
19200 66 20 -42 -100 -191 -330 1
38400 75 20 9 -66 -169 -250 1
x = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 8
600 50 33 25 0 -16 -28
1200 50 33 25 0 -16 -28
2400 66 50 40 16 0 -12
4800 66 50 40 16 12 0
9600 66 50 50 28 22 18
19200 66 20 14 0 -16 -38
38400 75 20 9 -66 -115 -131
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r = 4, s = 3
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 8 λ
600 66 50 40 16 0 -12 1
1200 66 50 40 16 12 0 1
2400 66 50 50 28 22 18 1
4800 66 60 57 37 36 30 1
9600 50 20 25 0 -7 -12 2
19200 0 -33 -44 -66 -75 -85 4
38400
-60 -128 -136 -166 -180 -184 8
x = 1
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 8 λ
600 66 0 -100 -233 -400 -600 1
1200 66 0 -100 -233 -337 -522 1
2400 66 0 -66 -185 -288 -409 1
4800 66 20 -42 -150 -218 -330 1
9600 75 20 -25 -100 -169 -250 1
19200 75 33 -11 -66 -118 -180 1
38400 80 42 9 -33 -75 -115 1
x = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 8
600 66 50 40 16 0 -12
1200 66 50 40 16 12 0
2400 66 50 50 28 22 18
4800 66 60 57 37 36 30
9600 75 20 25 0 -7 -12
19200 75 33 -11 -66 -75 -85
38400 80 42 9 -33 -75 -115
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r = 4, s = 4
k
b 4 5 6 7 8 λ
600 50 66 33 25 0 1
1200 50 66 33 25 0 1
2400 50 66 33 25 20 1
4800 50 66 50 25 20 1
9600 0 0 -25 -40 -50 2
19200
-33 -100 -150 -180 -200 4
38400
-166 -225 -300 -366 -428 8
x = 1
k
b 4 5 6 7 8 λ
600 50 33 -66 -100 -250 1
1200 50 33 -66 -100 -250 1
2400 50 33 -66 -100 -180 1
4800 50 33 -25 -100 -180 1
9600 50 33 -25 -60 -133 1
19200 66 33 -25 -60 -133 1
38400 66 50 0 -33 -100 1
x = 2
k
b 4 5 6 7 8 λ
600 50 -66 -400 -775 -1650 1
1200 50 -66 -400 -775 -1650 1
2400 50 -66 -400 -775 -1300 1
4800 50 -66 -275 -775 -1300 1
9600 50 -66 -275 -600 -1066 1
19200 66 -66 -275 -600 -1066 1
38400 66 -25 -200 -483 -900 1
x = 3
k
b 4 5 6 7 8
600 50 66 33 25 0
1200 50 66 33 25 0
2400 50 66 33 25 20
4800 50 66 50 25 20
9600 50 33 -25 -40 -50
19200 66 33 -25 -60 -133
38400 66 50 0 -33 -100
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r = 5, s = 3
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 8 λ
600 66 50 40 28 12 10 1
1200 66 50 50 37 22 18 1
2400 66 60 57 44 36 35 1
4800 50 33 25 9 0 -5 2
9600 0 -14 -30 -53 -64 -76 4
19200
-40 -75 -91 -118 -122 -132 7
38400
-116 -160 -186 -209 -213 -218 13
x = 1
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 8 λ
600 66 0 -100 -185 -337 -460 1
1200 66 0 -66 -150 -288 -409 1
2400 66 20 -42 -122 -218 -300 1
4800 75 33 -25 -81 -150 -229 1
9600 75 42 0 -53 -105 -166 1
19200 80 50 16 -25 -59 -100 1
38400 83 60 33 4 -20 -47 1
x = 2
k
b 3 4 5 6 7 8
600 66 50 40 28 12 10
1200 66 50 50 37 22 18
2400 66 60 57 44 36 35
4800 75 33 25 9 0 -5
9600 75 42 0 -53 -64 -76
19200 80 50 16 -25 -59 -100
38400 83 60 33 4 -20 -47
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r = 5, s = 4
k
b 4 5 6 7 8 λ
600 50 66 33 25 20 1
1200 50 66 50 40 20 1
2400 50 66 50 40 33 1
4800 33 0 -25 -40 -50 2
9600
-33 -50 -100 -133 -157 4
19200
-133 -175 -183 -242 -300 7
38400
-225 -320 -357 -462 -566 13
x = 1
k
b 4 5 6 7 8 λ
600 50 33 -66 -100 -180 1
1200 50 33 -25 -60 -180 1
2400 50 33 -25 -60 -133 1
4800 66 33 -25 -60 -133 1
9600 66 50 0 -33 -100 1
19200 66 50 16 -14 -75 1
38400 75 60 28 0 -55 1
x = 2
k
b 4 5 6 7 8 λ
600 50 -66 -400 -775 -1300 1
1200 50 -66 -275 -600 -1300 1
2400 50 -66 -275 -600 -1066 1
4800 66 -66 -275 -600 -1066 1
9600 66 -25 -200 -483 -900 1
19200 66 -25 -150 -400 -775 1
38400 75 0 -114 -337 -677 1
x = 3
k
b 4 5 6 7 8
600 50 66 33 25 20
1200 50 66 50 40 20
2400 50 66 50 40 33
4800 66 33 -25 -40 -50
9600 66 50 0 -33 -100
19200 66 50 16 -14 -75
38400 75 60 28 0 -55
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r = 5, s = 5
k
b 5 6 7 8 λ
600 50 50 33 33 1
1200 50 50 33 33 1
2400 50 50 33 33 1
4800 0 0 -33 -25 2
9600
-100 -100 -166 -175 4
19200
-133 -150 -250 -280 7
38400
-225 -280 -440 -500 13
x = 1
k
b 5 6 7 8 λ
600 50 0 0 -66 1
1200 50 0 0 -66 1
2400 50 0 0 -66 1
4800 50 33 0 -25 1
9600 50 33 0 -25 1
19200 66 50 25 0 1
38400 75 60 40 16 1
x = 2
k
b 5 6 7 8 λ
600 50 -50 -133 -366 1
1200 50 -50 -133 -366 1
2400 50 -50 -133 -366 1
4800 50 0 -133 -250 1
9600 50 0 -133 -250 1
9200 66 25 -75 -180 1
38400 75 40 -40 -133 1
x = 3
k
b 5 6 7 8 λ
600 50 -200 -600 -1766 1
1200 50 -200 -600 -1766 1
2400 50 -200 -600 -1766 1
4800 50 -100 -600 -1300 1
9600 50 -100 -600 -1300 1
9200 66 -50 -425 -1020 1
38400 75 -20 -320 -833 1
x = 4
k
b 5 6 7 8
600 50 50 33 33
1200 50 50 33 33
2400 50 50 33 33
4800 50 33 0 -25
9600 50 33 0 -25
19200 66 50 25 0
38400 75 60 40 16
ComboOverlap
Figure 3.11: lbAvail so(x, λ) − prAvail rnd for SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placements and
lbAvail co(λ0, . . . , λs−1) − prAvail rnd for best ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) placement (right
most column) when s > 2, as a percentage of the maximum possible improvement b− prAvail rnd,
when n = 257
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(
1− 1b
)kb`c for various n and r, as a function of k
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Lemma 8. Suppose s = 1, k < n/2, and ` = rbn . Then,
prAvail rnd ≤ b
(
1−
1
b
)kb`c
Proof. In choosing k nodes to fail, our adversary is guaranteed to be able to fail k b`c replicas
(because k < n/2) and, since s = 1, every object with one or more replicas in these k b`c replicas.
Let F denote the number of failed objects after the adversary induces k node failures. Contrast this
scenario to sampling k b`c objects with replacement from the objects obj1, . . . , objb, and let Y be
a random variable capturing the number of distinct objects sampled. We claim that P (F ≥ f) ≥
P (Y ≥ f) due to two key differences between our adversary’s scenario and simply sampling objects
at random with replacement: First, since a placement places only one replica per object on any node,
once the adversary selects a node to fail, it is guaranteed no repetitions of the same object on that
node. Second, our adversary can encounter at most r replicas of any object (versus up to k b`cwhen
sampling objects uniformly at random with replacement). As such,
E (F ) =
∞∑
f=1
P (F ≥ f) ≥
∞∑
f=1
P (Y ≥ f) = E (Y ) = b
[
1−
(
1−
1
b
)kb`c]
where the last step is well-known (e.g., [33, p. 31]). As such, when f = b
[
1−
(
1− 1b
)kb`c]
we
have Vuln rnd(f) ≥ 1, and so prAvail rnd ≤ b
(
1− 1b
)kb`c
.
To see one implication of this lemma, recall that (1− 1b )
b converges to e−1 as b −→∞. So, for
large enough b, prAvail rnd is at most approximately b(e−r/n)k. In terms of parameter values tested
elsewhere in this chapter, Figure 3.12 shows how 1bprAvail
rnd = (1 − 1/b)kb`c behaves for small
numbers of node failures (c.f., the s = 1 case of Figure 3.7). Figure 3.12 is plotted for b = 2400,
b = 9600 and b = 38400 (all three are virtually indistinguishable). This graph shows that the
availability of Random placements, as a fraction of b, decays essentially linearly in the number k
of failed nodes, with a slope that grows smaller as n increases or r decreases (since each node then
hosts fewer object replicas).
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3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we explored replica placement strategies based on t-packings, which we here
called SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placements, for maximizing the availability of objects in the face of
the worst k node failures out of n nodes total. We showed that a SimpleOverlap(x, λ) place-
ment provides availability that is c-competitive with optimal, for a specified constant c (for con-
stant n, k, replicas r, and fatality threshold s). We then devised a placement strategy called
ComboOverlap(λ0, . . . , λs−1) that combines multiple SimpleOverlap(x, λ) placements, and a dy-
namic programming algorithm that selects λ0, . . . , λs−1 so as to maximize (our lower bound on)
the availability of the resulting ComboOverlap placement for a chosen k. We showed that a re-
sulting ComboOverlap placement is not particularly sensitive to the value of k with which it is
configured, however; for the parameter values we explored, it offers availability for nearby k′ 6= k
within ≈ 99% of what the best ComboOverlap placement for k′ failed nodes would have. Finally,
we demonstrated and dissected the improvements offered by ComboOverlap over Random replica
placement, based on our analysis of the expected availability supported by Random placement in
our worst-case model.
Our algorithms leverage t-packings for parameters for which maximum t-packings (also called
t-designs, see Section 3.2.3) are known to exist, meaning that based on current knowledge, realis-
tically our results are limited to r ≤ 5. Fortunately, this suffices for a wide array of data center
applications in practice. Our work does, however, provide further impetus to advance the state-of-
the-art in t-packing construction.
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CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION
In this thesis we have identified a previously under-explored opportunity for improving the se-
curity of replicated objects in distributed systems, namely the placement of their replicas to manage
the degree to which objects’ replicas reside together on the same physical nodes. Specifically, we
have leveraged placements in two novel ways to improve either the confidentiality or the availability
of replicated objects.
The first example, presented in Chapter 2, is the system called StopWatch , from which an
infrastructure-as-a-service cloud can be constructed that convincingly defends its tenant VMs from
timing-based side-channel attacks mounted by other tenant VMs. The basic idea behind StopWatch
is to eliminate independent sources of clocks where possible by making some clock sources func-
tions of others, and then to leverage VM replication and placement to mitigate those independent
clock sources that could otherwise not be eliminated — namely those arising from the I/O subsystem
(network interrupts, disk interrupts, etc.). Then, by placing each VM’s replicas so that sufficiently
few overlap with each other VM’s replicas, StopWatch ensures that no VM observes timings that
are substantially influenced by the behavior of any other VM. In particular, this is done by ensur-
ing that any VM’s replicas observe event timings that represent the median timing of each event
across all of its replicas. In this way, if only a minority of a VM’s replicas are co-located with
the replicas of any other single VM, the behaviors of each other VM will influence these median
timings minimally. We showed that StopWatch can accomplish timing side-channel defense in this
way while incurring overheads that we believe to be reasonable in light of the strong defenses it
provides, including much less than 3× overhead for even I/O intensive applications in our tests.
The second example in this thesis, described in Chapter 3, uses placement of object replicas
to improve availability of objects. While enhanced availability is a conventional use of replication,
in this chapter we specifically targeted improved availability of objects against an adversary that
can intelligently choose which physical nodes to fail (limited only by a budget of nodes it can fail),
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in contrast to previous treatments of replica placement to address only probabilistic failures. We
showed that in our threat model, careful placement can be used to achieve better object availability
than the most popular placement approach under probabilistic node failures, namely random replica
placement. The specific placement that we demonstrated to do so involved placing replicas so as
to manage the overlaps of different objects’ replicas, and to optimally tune those overlaps (using
a dynamic programming algorithm) to accommodate the number of object replicas, the number of
node failures, the number of object replica failures that disables the object, the number of nodes,
and the number of objects.
Recall from our discussion of Chapter 1 that security is typically viewed as addressing con-
fidentiality, availability, or integrity. This thesis has demonstrated that in replicated systems and
specific threat models, placement of replicas can be managed in such a way that improves either
confidentiality or availability. A natural question, then, is whether placement can be used to effec-
tively improve object integrity. This is undoubtedly true if the compromise of all of one object’s
replicas by an attacker (e.g., due to a software vulnerability in the object) can be leveraged (e.g.,
through privilege escalation) to compromise the nodes hosting those replicas and so all replicas that
those nodes host. In this case, managing the overlaps of objects’ replicas can contain the damage
to other objects, particularly if each object leverages Byzantine fault-tolerant replica coordination
protocols (e.g., [55, 73, 24, 18, 45]) among its replicas to overcome these compromises. We leave
as future work the exploration of other such opportunities for using replica placement to improve
facets of security.
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